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INTRODUCTION
The global movement for human rights is redefining the world as we
know it. Our contemporary ideas about law--once so stable, so sure that
law was made and remade according to the positivities of state sover-
eignty in the world-have failed us. We are not prepared to deal with
the sudden emergence of human values as reflected in a global discourse
that nightly beams its vision of rights into our homes.
We now realize that we live in very complex times. On all fronts,
intellectual and material, we witness the crumbling of previously uncon-
tested boundaries. Some of the great canonical texts of Western civiliza-
tion are being questioned, not only in our universities, but in the capitals
of the world as well.
Not too long ago, it was fashionable for some legal academics in this
country to assert that rights discourse-that is, talk and thought about
rights-was actually harmful to the social movements of peoples of color
and other oppressed groups.1 And as recent times have shown, legal aca-
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1. See Crenshaw, Race Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in An-
tidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1352-56 (1988) (discussing the critique of rights and
rights discourse found in the works of critical legal scholars (CLS) such as Alan Freeman, Mark
Tushnet, and Peter Gabel); Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1987) (assessing various critical legal studies
perspectives and their usefulness in containing and eliminating racism); R. Williams, Taking Rights
Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Studies for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INE-
QUALITY 103 (1987) (discussing critical legal studies' negative assessments of the efficacy of rights
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demics of color can attract a great deal of attention and the sympathies of
anonymous white colleagues by telling us that the sufferings and stories
rhetoric). On uses of narratives and storytelling in critical race scholarship, see, e.g., D. BELL, AND
WE ARE NoT SAVED 6 (1987) (noting that a "lawyer's primary task is translating human stories
into legal stories and retranslating legal story endings into solutions to human problems"; Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2411, 2440 (1989)
[hereinafter Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists] (supporting the use of legal storytelling because
it "invites the listener to suspend judgment, listen for the story's point, and test it against his or her
own version of reality"; storytelling gains the understanding, if not the support of the white major-
ity); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV.
2320, 2380 (1989) (proposing the "criminalization of a narrow, explicitly defined class of racist hate
speech, to provide public redress for the most serious harm, while leaving many forms of racist
speech to private remedies"); P. Williams, Alchemical Notes" Reconstructing Ideals from Decon-
structed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 432 (1987) (arguing that the task for CLS is "to
expand private property rights into a conception of civil rights, into the right to expect civility from
others"). Feminist legal scholars also have relied on narrative as part of their methodology. See,
e-g., Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REV. 751, 752-
54 (1989) (arguing that Catharine MacKinnon's FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), believes the sub-
stance of feminist jurisprudence can be developed through the feminist method of inquiry defined as
"believing women's accounts of sexual use and abuse by men"; Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal
Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or the "Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 61, 85 (1988) (employing personal narrative to review the similarities and divergences
in the critiques of legal education offered by critical legal studies and feminist theory).
Professor Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw has spoken of the usefulness of rights discourse to the
civil rights movement in this country in the following terms:
Rights have been important. They may have legitimated racial inequality, but they have
also been the means by which oppressed groups have secured both entry as formal equals
into the dominant order and the survival of their movement in the face of private and state
repression....
The Critics are correct in observing that engaging in rights discourse has helped to
deradicalize and co-opt the challenge. Yet they fail to acknowledge the limited range of
options presented to Blacks in a context where they were deemed "other," and the unlikeli-
hood that specific demands for inclusion and equality would be heard if articulated in other
terms.
Crenshaw, supra, at 1384-85.
Professor Richard Delgado has described the power of stories to transform the way we think in
the following terms:
Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying mindset-
the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a
background of which legal and political discourse takes place. These matters are rarely
focused on. They are like eyeglasses we have worn a long time. They are nearly invisible;
we use them to scan and interpret the world and only rarely examine them for themselves.
Ideology-the received wisdom-makes current social arrangements seem fair and natural.
Those in power sleep well at night-their conduct does not seem to them like oppression.
The cure is storytelling (or as I shall sometimes call it, counterstorytelling)....
... Counterstories, which challenge the received wisdom.... can open new windows
into reality, showing us that there are possibilities for life other than the ones we live....
Counterstories can quicken and engage conscience. Their graphic quality can stir imagina-
tion in ways in which more conventional discourse cannot.
But stories and counterstories can serve an equally important destructive function. They
can show that what we believe is ridiculous, self-serving, or cruel. They can show us the
way out of the trap of unjustified exclusion. They can help us understand when it is time to
reallocate power. They are the other half-the destructive half--of the creative dialectic.
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists, supra, at 2413-15 (footnotes omitted).
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of peoples of color in this country possess no unique capacity to trans-
form the law.2
These legal academic denials of the efficacy of rights discourse and
storytelling for the social movements of peoples of color now seem dis-
harmonious with the larger transformations occurring in the world.
Why any legal academics would discount the usefulness of such proven,
liberating forms of discourse in the particular society they serve from
their positions of privilege is a curious and contentious question.
The disaggregated narratives of human rights struggles on the
nightly news apparently have not been sufficient for some legal academ-
ics. They want documented accounts demonstrating the efficacy of rights
discourse and storytelling in the social movements of outsider groups.
Empirical evidence of the traditions, histories, and lives of oppressed peo-
ples actually transforming legal thought and doctrine about rights could
then be used to cure skeptics of the critical race scholarly enterprise.3
"See here," the still unconverted in the faculty lounge can be told, "this
stuff works, if applied and systematized correctly."
Despite the attacks from society's dominant groups in the legal aca-
demic spectrum-both the left and right-the voices of legal scholars of
color have sought to keep faith with the struggles and aspirations of op-
pressed peoples around the world. These emerging voices recognize that
now is the time to intensify the struggle for human rights on all fronts-
to heighten demands, engage in intense political rhetoric, and sharpen
critical thinking about all aspects of legal thought and doctrine.
The rapid emergence of indigenous peoples' human rights as a sub-
ject of major concern and action in contemporary international law pro-
vides a unique opportunity to witness the application of rights discourse
and storytelling in institutionalized, law-bound settings around the
2. See, eg., Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989).
This article, by Professor Randall Kennedy, challenges the view "that some members of marginal-
ized groups, by virtue of their marginal status, are able to tell stories different from the ones legal
scholars usually hear," or that such stories reveal new types of valuable knowledge about the world
that ought to be known. Delgado, hen A Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA.
L. REv. 95, 95 (1990). Kennedy, a scholar of color, has drawn a great deal of attention for his
article and his views. See, eg., Wiener, Law Profs Fight the Power, NATION, Sept. 4, 1989, at 246.
In a New York Times article containing a three column picture of the African-American Harvard
law school professor at his desk, Kennedy was defended by "a white professor, speaking on condi-
tion of anonymity," who asserted the existence of "a sort of 'lynch Randy Kennedy' mind-set."
Rothfeld, Controversy Over Minority Writing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at B6, col. 3.
3. On critical race theory and scholarship, see Delgado, supra note 2, at 103 (noting that
critical race theorists are impatient with the dominant discourse of liberal legalism and its outlook of
"[p]atience, vigilance, liberal legalism and measured progress" regarding civil rights and race
relations).
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world.4 By telling their own stories in recognized and authoritative in-
4. There is, as Professor Hurst Hannum explains, no "commonly accepted definition of the
term 'indigenous' in contemporary international law discourse." Hannum, New Developments in
Indigenous Rights. 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 649 (1988). For the leading United Nations Study on Indige-
nous Populations, see J. COBO, STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGE-
NOUS POPULATIONS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1986)
[hereinafter UN INDIGENOUS STUDY]. This study attempts to distinguish Indigenous Populations
from other minority groups by the following definition:
378. Indigenous populations may, therefore, be defined as follows for the purposes of
international action that may be taken affecting their future existence:
379. Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories,
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the'societies now prevailing in those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present nondominant sectors of society and are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territo-
ries, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in ac-
cordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
380. This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period
reaching into the present, of one or more of the following factors:
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal
system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style,
etc.);
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means
of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or
normal language);
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world;(t) Other relevant factors.
381. On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to these indigenous
populations through self-identification as indigenous (group consciousness) and is recog-
nized and accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the group).
382. This preserves for these communities the sovereign right and power to decide who
belongs to them, without external interference.
Id at 4.
Such efforts at a formal definition have not been generally accepted by indigenous peoples and
their advocates who participate in the international human rights standard-setting process. Gener-
ally, indigenous peoples have insisted on the right to define themselves.
For purposes of this Article, "indigenous" peoples are those groups colonized by Western and
other settler states and who have lost their sovereignty while maintaining a distinct cultural identity.
Indigenous peoples usually seek to sustain their distinct cultural identity in intimate relation with
their traditionally-occupied territories. The best evidence of this distinct cultural identity results
from indigenous peoples identifying themselves as such.
The sudden emergence of indigenous peoples' human rights in international law is documented
in official texts of the international legal system, most notably and recently by the June 1989 adop-
tion of Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples by the International Labor Organization
(ILO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. The proposed Convention 169, now open for
immediate ratification by ILO member states, revises the 1957 ILO Convention No. 107 on the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independ-
ent Countries. INT'L LABOUR ORG., CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 1919-66, at 901-15 (1966).
Convention 107 was the only previously existing international legal instrument directly ad-
dressed to questions of indigenous peoples' rights. Its integrationist approach to indigenous rights
issues was widely criticized and rejected by indigenous advocacy groups in the 1970s and 1980s,
leading to its revision and adoption of the new Convention 169 by the ILO in June 1989. See INT'L
LABOUR ORG., INT'L LABOUR CONFERENCE, 76TH SESSION, REPORT IV(2A): PARTIAL REVISION
OF THE INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL POPULATIONS CONVENTION, 1957 (No. 107) (1989). More coin-
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ternational human rights standard-setting bodies during the past decade,
indigenous peoples have sought to redefine the terms of their right to
survival under international law. 5
Under present, Western-dominated conceptions of international
law, indigenous peoples are regarded as subjects of the exclusive domes-
tic jurisdiction of the settler state regimes that invaded their territories
and established hegemony during prior colonial eras.6 At present, inter-
national law does not contest unilateral assertions of state sovereignty
that limit, or completely deny the collective cultural rights of indigenous
peoples.7 Contemporary international law also does not concern itself
with protecting indigenous peoples' traditionally-occupied territories
from uncompensated state appropriation, even when indigenous territo-
ries are secured through treaties with a state. According to contempo-
rary international discourse, such treaties should be treated as legal
prehensive treatment of Convention 107 and the ILO revision process can be found in Berman, The
International Labour Organization and Indigenous Peoples: Revision ofl .LO. Convention No. 107 at
the 75th Session of the International Labour Conference, 1988, 41 INr'L COMM'N JURISTS Rnv. 48
(1988).
The field of indigenous rights in international law is itself undergoing a scholarly renaissance.
Gordon Bennett's ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Occasional Paper No. 37 of the
Royal Anthropological Inst. of Gr. Brit. and Ir., 1978), was one important work signaling increased
interest among Western legal scholars in questions of fundamental justice for indigenous peoples
under international law. Russell Lawrence Barsh and Douglas Sanders, both prolific scholars and
long-time indigenous human rights advocates, did much to sustain serious consideration on this
topic in the North American legal literature throughout the 1980s. See, eg., Barsh, Current Devel-
opments: Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 369
(1986) [hereinafter Barsh, Emerging Object] (discussing international concern about the rights of
indigenous peoples with special attention to the UN activity); Barsh, Indigenous North America and
Contemporary International Law, 62 OR. L. REv. 73 (1983) [hereinafter Barsh, Indigenous North
America] (tracing the development of international human rights law respecting indigenous peoples
and arguing that real progress has occurred only in the last 20 years with the coming of UN involve-
ment); Sanders, The Re-Emergence of Indigenous Questions in International Law, in CANADIAN
HUMAN RIGHs Y.ARBOOK No. 3 (1983) (describing indigenous rights movements that have
fought for legal rights in international forums in the 19th and 20th centuries).
Today, an international community of indigenous and non-indigenous legal and interdiscipli-
nary scholars generates a lively literature comprising the field of indigenous rights in international
law. See Roy & Alfredsson, Indigenous Rights: The Literature Explosion, 13 TRANSNAT'L PER-
SPEcTIVEs 19 (1987). Major figures of contemporary international law scholarship have now fo-
cused their attention on indigenous rights questions. See, eg., Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In
Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 17 (J. Crawford ed. 1988) (discusses the
statist concept of human rights, concluding that new approach needed to adequately protect indige-
nous peoples' basic rights); see also Hannum, supra, at 649 (discussing UN interest in human rights
of indigenous peoples historically and comments on current trends).
The human rights group Cultural Survival has published a collection of essays offering valuable
interdisciplinary perspectives and a comprehensive bibliography on indigenous human rights issues.
See HUMAN RIGHTs AND ANTHROPOLOGY (T. Downing & G. Kushner eds. 1988).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 67-79.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 37-52.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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nullities.8 Finally, modem international law refuses to recognize indige-
nous peoples as "peoples," entitled to rights of self-determination as
specified in United Nations and other major international human rights
legal instruments. 9
Since the 1970s, in international human rights forums around the
world, indigenous peoples have contested the international legal system's
continued acquiescence to the assertions of exclusive state sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the terms of their survival. Pushed to the brink of
extinction by state-sanctioned policies of genocide and ethnocide, indige-
nous peoples have demanded heightened international concern and legal
protection for their continued survival.10
The emergence of indigenous rights in contemporary international
legal discourse is a direct response to the consciousness-raising efforts of
indigenous peoples in international human rights forums. Specialized in-
ternational and regional bodies, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and advocacy groups are now devoting greater attention to in-
digeious human rights concerns.11 By far the most important of these
specialized initiatives to emerge out of the indigenous human rights
movement is the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions (Working Group). The Working Group is composed of five inter-
national legal experts drawn from the United Nations Sub-Commission
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The
Working Group was created by the Sub-Commission's parent body, the
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1982 and
given a specific mandate to develop international legal standards for the
protection of indigenous peoples' human rights.' 2
The Working Group, at its 1989 session at the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland, presented a First Re-
vised Text of a Draft Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.13 This Draft Declaration is being prepared by the Working
Group for initial approval by the ECOSOC subsidiary bodies and for
8. See infra taxt accompanying notes 126-30.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 108-21.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 122-34.
11. See Hannum, supra note 4, at 652-54 (describing various specialized international agencies
and groups devoted to indigenous rights concerns).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 54-59.
13. Discrimination Against Indigenous People First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Decla-
ration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33 (1989) [hereinafter WG
Draft] (prepared by the Chairman-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations,
Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes). During its 1990 session, the Working Group continued discussion on the
Draft Universal Declaration released in 1989. It is expected that the suggested amendments raised
and presented at the 1990 session will be considered by Mrs. Daes for incorporation in a Second
Revised Text, expected to be released at the 1991 Working Group Session.
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ultimate ratification by the United Nations General Assembly as an in-
ternational human rights instrument exclusively devoted to the protec-
tion of indigenous peoples' survival.
In its present form, the Working Group's Draft Universal Declara-
tion would dramatically expand international legal protection for indige-
nous peoples' human rights.1 4 The Draft therefore represents one of the
most significant by-products of indigenous involvement in the interna-
tional human rights process during the past decade. This Article de-
scribes the central role of indigenous peoples' own stories in the Working
Group's efforts toward development of an internationally recognized
legal instrument declaring the human rights of indigenous peoples.
For the skeptical and uninitiated, Part I of the Article offers a brief,
introductory account of how the international human rights legal process
is understood to work by scholars, experts, and other close observers of
the international legal system's authoritative modes of decisionmaking
and enforcement of human rights values.1 5 Part II then provides a gen-
eral account of the historical treatment of indigenous tribal peoples' sta-
tus and rights under the doctrine of discovery and related principles in
international law.16 Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States
Supreme Court propounded the most influential formulation of the Euro-
pean, colonial-era-derived discovery doctrine in international law. Ac-
cording to Marshall's 1823 opinion for a unanimous Court in Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 17 the discovery of territory occupied by American Indian
tribes in the New World gave the discovering European nation "an ex-
clusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by
purchase or conquest."18 This legal practice of denying native tribes full
title or sovereign rights in the territories they occupied was adopted by
Spain, Great Britain, and all the major European colonizing nations as
the law of "civilized" nations in their dealings with indigenous peoples
whose territories they invaded. 19
14. See infra text accompanying notes 131-40.
15. For an example of legal academic skepticism of the international human rights process as it
might relate to the rights of indigenous peoples, see Laurence, Learning to Live With the Plenary
Power of Congress Over The Indian Nations, 30 ARIz. L. REv. 413, 429-30 (1988). In this article,
Professor Laurence, in response to my advocation of broadened access for indigenous peoples in
international legal forums, see R. Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219, 293-
99, declared that he has "little faith in the ability of public international law to protect any valuable
rights. I have no faith in the ability of public international law to put bread on American Indian
tables." Laurence, supra, at 428.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 37-52.
17. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
18. IdL at 573.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 46-52.
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The United States and other Western settler states formally adopted
the colonial principles supporting the doctrine of discovery as outlined
by Justice Marshall in Johnson as part of their domestic law of indige-
nous peoples' rights and status.20 European and other Western writers
on international law in the 19th century regarded this "customary" prac-
tice of Western colonizing nations as demonstrating the general accept-
ance of denying indigenous peoples' territorial rights and equal
sovereignty as part of the "civilized" world's law of nations. This con-
ception of indigenous peoples' diminished rights and status derived from
the doctrine of discovery, still retains valuable currency in international
legal discourse today.21
The stories told by indigenous peoples and their advocates to inter-
national human rights forums during the past decade have sought to de-
value the legitimacy of legal principles derived from the doctrine of
discovery, which denies indigenous peoples' rights and status in interna-
tional law. Part III of this Article discusses the emergence of indigenous
human rights in contemporary international legal discourse.22 Indige-
nous peoples have sought to raise consciousness about the failures of set-
tler state regimes throughout the world to protect the survival of
indigenous peoples by presenting their stories to international human
rights bodies such as the Working Group. In challenging the exclusive
jurisdictional claims of settler state governments to define the terms of
their survival in the world, indigenous peoples have given voice to a new
vision of the human rights that matter to them under international law.
This vision seeks international legal recognition of indigenous peoples'
collective human rights to exist as culturally autonomous peoples, to
continue in the peaceful possession of their traditionally occupied territo-
ries, and to exercise greater self-determining autonomy over their ways of
life.23
Part IV of this Article analyzes the Working Group's Draft Univer-
sal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples.24 The Working
Group's Draft Declaration represents a formal response to indigenous
peoples' concerns by one important recognized standard-setting body in
the international human rights legal process. Because a Universal Decla-
ration on Indigenous Rights would seek to assume the same authoritative
and normative role in the international legal system presently filled by
other international human rights instruments, the Working Group Draft
20. See infra text accompanying notes 37-45.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 46-49 & 122-30.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 53-69.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
24. See WG Draft supra note 13. See also infra text accompanying notes 70-134.
Vol. 1990:660]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
provides one important measure of the power of indigenous peoples' own
stories to transform legal thought and doctrine about the rights that mat-
ter to them.
The Article concludes in Part V by offering some reflections on the
emergence of indigenous rights in international law and the efficacy of
rights discourse and consciousness-raising through narrative for op-
pressed groups. Several critical race theorists, most notably Professor
Richard Delgado, have argued that dispute resolution forums seeking to
constrain bias and prejudice through formal rules and procedures may be
more likely to achieve substantive justice for outsider groups. 25 This the-
sis is explored in the context of the Working Group's standard-setting
activities in order to develop a better understanding of the importance of
fairness and formality for the efficacy of rights discourse and conscious-
ness-raising through narrative in the struggles of peoples of color. 26
r
I. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM
27
What explains the sudden emergence of indigenous rights in interna-
tional human rights law and discourse during the past decade?28 Why
have so many indigenous peoples and their advocates turned to interna-
tional human rights forums for redress of their grievances against settler
State governments? When so much work needs to be done to transform
the domestic laws of states that exercise jurisdiction and power over the
terms of their survival in the world, why have indigenous peoples placed
such great faith and efforts in the international human rights process?
Like many other oppressed peoples who have appealed to the
emerging discourse of international human rights in recent years, indige-
nous peoples recognize that international human rights law and norms
25. See, ag., Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality. Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359 [hereinafter Delgado &
Dunn, Minimizing Risk]; Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed: Recent Books About the Deformaliza-
tion Movement (Book Review), 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 145 (1988).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 135-55.
27. There is a vast, scholarly literature on the international human rights process and how it
works. Deserving special mention is 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES (T. Meron ed. 1984) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS], a collection of essays that covers
the principal human rights areas and provides an excellent starting point for law students and
scholars interested in understanding the international human rights process. For a provocative and
stimulating effort at a theoretical systematization of the field, see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL &
L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980). See also HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION (R. Claude & B. Weston eds. 1989); NEw DIRECTIONS IN
HUMAN RIGMS (E. Lutz, H. Hannum & K. Burke eds. 1989); V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS,
ETHNICITY, AND DISCRIMINATION (1985).
28. See, ag., sources cited in supra note 4.
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have come to assume a more authoritative and even constraining role on
state actors in the world.29 Government assertions in the international
community that abuses of its citizens' human rights are matters of exclu-
sive domestic concern have become more difficult to sustain. Various
formal and informal mechanisms have proven capable of ameliorating
abusive state practices violative of international human rights instru-
ments and standards. Wanton state violators of international legal
norms often pay the price of increasing isolation. Vitally important eco-
nomic and cultural exchange opportunities often are constricted by the
international community in reaction to a sovereign state's human rights
abuses of its citizens. Although state responses to pressure from the in-
ternational human rights process may not always be sincere or even sus-
tained over time, experience indicates that few governments actively
desire pariah status in the international community.30
What indigenous peoples have sought to achieve in the international
human rights process during the past decade is to transform the present
conceptions about indigenous rights that dominate the international legal
system. Seeking to reverse the controlling assumption that indigenous
peoples are not proper legal subjects of international concern or sanction,
a primary goal of indigenous advocates has been to create a formal inter-
national legal declaration of indigenous rights. Such a declaration would
recognize those rights that matter to the survival of indigenous peoples
that are not currently recognized or adequately protected by the legal
systems of settler states. 31
The UN General Assembly's adoption of a Universal Declaration
on Rights of Indigenous Peoples is one important goal of a broad-based
movement to transform legal thought and doctrine about indigenous
29. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, INDIGE-
NOUS PEOPLES: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter GLOBAL QUEST]. The In-
dependent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues in assessing the future rule of human
rights organizations stated that:
In the coming years international and non-governmental [human rights] organizations are
likely to have a critical impact on the aspirations of indigenous peoples. They represent to
a great extent the moral consciousness of the world. Their actions can create a favorable
climate for governments to include indigenous peoples among their priorities. Some have
done pioneering work in focusing international attention on them.
Id. at 115. See generally Alfredsson, International Law, International Organizations and Indigenous
Peoples, 36 3. INT'L AFF. 113 (1982) (discussing the emergence of indigenous peoples' concerns in
the international human rights legal system).
30. See M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 27, at 313-60 (describing and
analyzing the various modes of authoritative decision processes for enforcing human rights
prescriptions).
31. See Barsh, Emerging Object, supra note 4, at 378-83 (describing indigenous advocacy and
state recognition of the need for a special legal instrument on indigenous human rights that goes
beyond existing international norms of human rights).
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rights in international and domestic arenas. 32 Through appeals to the
broadly-stated standards and values contained in the human rights decla-
rations and instruments adopted by the UN General Assembly, the
global human rights process has demonstrated its efficacy despite its ad-
mittedly weak formal sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms. Moral
suasion, shame, and the simple capacity to appeal to an internationally
recognized legal standard for human rights have all done much to under-
mine the legitimacy of state-sanctioned domestic practices that deny
human rights. Human rights values have been secured through the inter-
national legal process in a number of domestic political and legal sys-
tems.33 There is reason to hope for similar domestic effects once the
standards enunciated in a Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous
Peoples enter the official legal discourse of the international human rights
process.
Particularly with respect to the domestic legal systems of the West-
ern settler states, the emerging international legal discourse of indigenous
human rights holds significant transformative potential. Many of the
Western settler state governments actively have advocated international
acceptance of the norms and principles embodied in existing interna-
tional human rights instruments.34 The United States, for example, has a
poor record of formal ratification of human rights instruments. But the
United States government nonetheless has proved capable of aggressive
and at times even effective advocacy of human rights standards in inter-
national relations with East Bloc and Third World nations.35 Whether
increases in the respect for human rights in those countries represents a
response to abstractly stated human values or to the calculated dimen-
sions of global power politics is largely an academic's question. The in-
ternational human rights process relies on both forms of persuasion in
achieving its sometimes considerable synergistic effectiveness. The dis-
32. See GLOBAL QUEST, supra note 29, at 31-131.
33. See, eg., i at 109-31 (describing the efforts of the World Bank, International Labour
Organization, and UN bodies to protect indigenous people and suggestions for further protection);
M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 27, at 313-60 (discussing the impact of
international human rights standards on state actors).
34. See, eg., Meron, Teaching Human Rights: An Overview, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
27, at 1, 11-24 (arguing that human rights are relevant to university students; one principal reason is
that Western nations claim to value human rights and have made this their public position at the
U.N.).
35. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NAT'L DEFENSE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SER-
VICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 96T CONG., IsT SEss., HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN ASSIST-
ANCE: EXPERIENCES AND ISSUES IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (1977-78) 5 (Comm. Print 1979)
(finding that "U.S. policy has sensitized foreign governments to human rights issues and has been a
contributing factor in many situations where conditions have improved."). See generally Meron,
supra note 34, at 18-24 (discussing status and acceptance of human rights standards internationally).
[Vol. 1990:660
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS
course of human rights is intended to transform moral and institutional
patterns of thought and action.
Such strategic factors, therefore, suggest that a major goal for indig-
enous rights advocates in the Western settler states must be to use a Uni-
versal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in whatever form it
emerges from the human rights standard-setting process, to transform
the perception of the Western settler state governments that human
rights only amount to a foreign policy concern. The standards'and prin-
ciples declared in a Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples must enter into the domestic policy discourse of these states as an
urgent matter affecting their own moral standing and authority in the
international community as progressive advocates of international
human rights standards and values.
It is worth noting, in fact, that in the sessions of the Working Group
and other international human rights forums, the governments of the
United States, Australia, and New Zealand-all of which possess exem-
plary reputations for protecting individual human rights within their do-
mestic legal systems-are among the most frequently cited violators of
indigenous peoples' human rights. For indigenous peoples colonized by
those countries in particular, the ability to appeal to a differently in-
flected legitimating discourse contained in a Universal Declaration on
Rights of Indigenous Peoples could contribute significantly to transform-
ing the domestic legal systems of those countries toward the goal of pro-
tecting indigenous peoples. The Declaration would provide indigenous
peoples, at least in the more progressive Western states, with opportuni-
ties literally to redefine the terms of their survival. And given that these
more progressive Western states consistently have demonstrated a will-
ingness to advocate internationally those human rights standards that
they have adopted as their own state practices,_there is reason also to
hope for the progressive advancement of indigenous human rights in
countries less committed to assuring indigenous survival. Just as the civil
rights movement in the United States, with its emphases on minority
rights and facilitating freedoms of speech and protest, contributed signifi-
cantly to the promotion and recognition of individual human rights in-
ternationally,36 the emerging discourse of indigenous human rights holds
the potential for transforming legal thought and doctrine in a similar,
36. See Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 405 (1979). Louis Henkin
assessed the American contribution to the international recognition of human rights in the following
fashion:
Americans were prominent among the architects and builders of international human
rights, and American constitutionalism was a principal inspiration and model for them. As
a result, most of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the International
Vol. 1990:660]
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progressive global fashion. Legitimation and acceptance of this new
human rights discourse in the domestic law of Western states that tradi-
tionally have exercised moral leadership and authority in the interna-
tional human rights process can lead to acceptance of indigenous rights
in countries less alert to the importance of vigorously protecting human
rights as defined by international standard-setting activities.
II. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INDIGENOUS
RIGHTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY
Why is it that modem international law denies whatever modest
protections it might provide to indigenous peoples and their continued
survival? Why does the international legal system regard the cultural
survival, territorial integrity, and self-determining autonomy of indige-
nous peoples as matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the settler
state regimes that invaded and subjugated them?
The present dominant conceptions of indigenous rights in interna-
tional law largely derive from principles associated with the European
doctrine of discovery.37 For five hundred years, this doctrine and its dis-
course of diminished indigenous legal status and rights has been relied on
by European and European-derived settler states to regulate and legiti-
mate their colonial activities in indigenous peoples' territories.38 The
most famous and influential elaboration of this doctrine in international
law is Chief Justice John ,Marshall's opinion for the United States
Supreme Court in the 1823 case, Johnson v. M'Intosh. 39 In Johnson, the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are in their essence American constitutional rights
projected around the world.
Ia at 415 (citations omitted).
Professor Mary Dudziak has demonstrated in an enlightening fashion the reciprocal influence
of the early international human rights movement on the United States Civil Rights era. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1988).
37. I discuss at length the emergence and descent of the doctrine of discovery in contemporary
international and domestic legal thought and doctrine in R. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DiscouRSEs OF CONQUEST (1990). See also Berman, The Con-
cept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 637
(1979) (discussing the doctrine's genealogy in United States federal Indian law); R. Williams, supra
note 15, at 226-65 (discussing doctrine's legacy in modem federal Indian law and international law).
38. See, eg., sources cited in supra note 4.
39. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Johnson's genealogy as a constitutive text of the customary
international law of the Western world regarding indigenous rights can be traced in the following
domestic law judicial decisions: Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, 34 D.L.R.3d 145
(1973) (Canada); In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] App. Cas. 211 (P.C. 1918); St. Catherine's Milling
and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 13 S.C.R. 577 (1887) (Canada); Regina v. Symonds, 1847
N.Z.P.C.C. 387 (New Zealand). Professor Robert Clinton has written an excellent study on the
development of "Indian title" theory in English-speaking settler states. See Clinton, The Proclama-
tion of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict Over the Management of
Indian Affairs, 69 B.U.L. REV. 329 (1989).
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Supreme Court held that under principles derived from Europe's law of
nations, the discovery of territory occupied by Indian tribes in the New
World gave to the discovering European nation "an exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or
conquest." 4
"The character and religion" of the indigenous peoples of the New
World, Marshall explained in Johnson, "afforded an apology for consid-
ering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might
claim an ascendancy."'41 Under this doctrine of discovery, the American
Indians' "rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied." 42 Under the Europeans'
rule of international law, Marshall declared, the discovery of indigenous
territory gave an "exclusive title" to the European discoverers of the
New World.4 3
Marshall further explained in Johnson that once indigenous tribes
were "discovered," they became the "exclusive" concern of their discov-
ering European nation. Spain, Great Britain, and the other colonizing
states of Europe all had claimed and exercised superior sovereign rights
to indigenous territories in the New World under the doctrine's jurisdic-
tional principles. 4 And also, by Marshall's opinion for the Supreme
Court in Johnson v. M'Intosh, the doctrine of discovery was incorporated
formally into the domestic law of the United States. 45
The century-long era of Western global expansion following Mar-
shall's 1823 opinion in Johnson significantly extended and refined the
scope of application of the doctrine of discovery. The Western writers
and theorists who dominated international law during this era inter-
preted the doctrine's widespread reception in the domestic law of Euro-
pean-derived settler states as evidence of the principles of a customary
law of all "civilized" nations in dealing with indigenous peoples.4 Their
40. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
41. Id. at 573. On the development of this central idea of Western colonial legal thought that
the American Indian's normative divergence justified European conquests in the New World, see
generally R. WILLIAMS, supra note 37.
42. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.
43. Id. at 574.
44. Id at 595-97. See generally R. WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 325-28 (discussing the emer-
gence and descent of the doctrine of discovery in contemporary international and domestic legal
thought and doctrine).
45. R. WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 308-17.
46. The influence of the Western "positivist" writers who dominated international law in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries and their interpretations of indigenous rights in the field they
dominated are more thoroughly discussed in Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Interna-
tional Law in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, in HARVARD INDIAN LAW SYMPOSIUM 191
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books and treatises asserted that the only territorial titles recognized by
international law are the titles held by "civilized" members of the family
of Western nations.47 These writers did not regard indigenous peoples
(1989) (discussing the inconsistency between natural rights tradition in the West and the treatment
of native peoples under international law); Barsh, Indigenous North America, supra note 4, at 74-80
(discussing colonial powers territorial expansion for "good of natives" from 1880s to 1930s and the
development of notion of "trusteeship"); Hackshaw, Nineteenth Century Notions of Aboriginal Title
and their Influence on the Interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, in WAITANGI: MORI & PKEH,
PERSPECTIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 92 (I.H. Kawharu ed. 1989) [hereinafter, WAITANGI]
(states make international law through practice rather than through discovery of existing rules of
natural law; in New Zealand, positivist law required a European-style government to establish title
to land recognized by the Crown); National Indian Youth Council, The Rights and Status ofIndige-
nous Peoples Under International Law During the Classical Era Treaty Period, 1600-1840 (prepared
and submitted by R. Williams to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations,
Seventh Session, July 31-August 4, 1989, Geneva, Switzerland).
47. See generally C. HYDE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES 320-30 (1945) ("TIhe thought early obtained, at least with respect to the
western hemisphere, that the native inhabitants possessed no rights of territorial control such as
could be assimilated to a right of sovereignty which a European monarch was bound to respect.").
Id. at 328. Similar viewpoints can be found stated in a number of leading treatises of the period.
See, e-g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 383-84 (R. Roxburg 3d ed. 1920) ("[O]nly such
territory may be the object of occupation as is no state's land, whether entirely uninhabited, as e.g.
an island, or inhabited by natives whose community is not to be considered as a state."); J. WEST-
LAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-40 (1894) ("Occupation by
uncivilised tribes of a tract... was not felt to interpose a serious obstacle to the right of the first
civilised occupant.").
British publicist John Westlake was perhaps one of the most influential international legal theo-
rists of the late 19th century to write on the topic of indigenous rights under then current positivist-
inspired views of international law. In his widely-disseminated CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, Westlake distinguished between "civilized and uncivilized human-
ity." International law and society were concerned only with relations between "civilized" states-
i.e., those with European state-forms of government. See id. at 136-38. As for the international legal
status of indigenous peoples, Westlake had this to say:
When people of European race come into contact with American or African tribes, the
prime necessity is a government under the protection of which the former [European race]
may carry on the complex life to which they have been accustomed in their homes.... and
which may protect the natives in the enjoyment of a security and well-being at least not less
than they enjoyed before the arrival of the strangers. Can the natives furnish such a gov-
ernment, or can it be looked for from the Europeans alone? In the answer to that question
lies, for international law, the difference between civilisation and want ofit.... The inflow
of the white race cannot be stopped where there is land to cultivate, ore to be mined,
commerce to be developed, sport to enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied. If any fanatical admirer
of savage life argued that the whites ought to be kept out, he would only be driven to the
same conclusion by another route, for a government on the spot would be necessary to
keep him out. Accordingly, international law has to treat such natives as uncivilised.
Id. at 141-43.
Lassa Oppenheim, another well-respected and widely-published international law scholar of this
era, specified:
[Three conditions for the admission of new members into the circle of the Family of Na-
tions. A State to be admitted must, first, be a civilised State which is in constant inter-
course with members of the Family of Nations. Such state must, secondly, expressly or
tacitly consent to be bound for its future international conduct by the rules of International
Law. And, thirdly, those States which have hitherto formed the Family of Nations must
expressly or tacitly consent to the reception of the new member.
L. OPPENHEIM, supra, at 32.
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living under a "backwards" tribal organization as members of that select
group of states.48 Therefore, they concluded, for purposes of interna-
tional law, indigenously occupied territories can be regarded as terra nul-
lius-that is, as lands without a recognized owner and available for
occupation by a civilized member of the Western family of nations.49
Significantly extending the principles of the doctrine of discovery as
first elaborated by Marshall, the dominant discourse of Western interna-
tional lawyers and theorists of this era denied effective rights of self-de-
termination to indigenous peoples. "Civilized" states pursued a sacred
duty of trust by dismantling "tribal organization" and treating indige-
nous peoples "as individuals under guardianship. ' 50
Through the preachings of these Western theorists, indigenous peo-
ples were effectively dismissed as subjects of concern in international
legal discourse.51 Indigenous territories were regarded as vacant and ap-
propriable by a "civilized" Western state. Indigenous peoples did not
possess internationally recognizable rights of self-determination. They
48. See, ag., M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-23 (1926) (discussing the views of those who do not consider the lim-
ited degree of sovereignty that might be possessed by "backwards" peoples a bar to occupation of
those peoples' lands); J. WEsTLAKE, supra note 47, at 141-43 ("natives" incapable of furnishing
government sufficiently "civilised" to merit recognition by "family of nations").
49. See C. HYDE, supra note 47, at 175 ("If the inhabitants of the territory concerned are an
uncivilized people, deemed to be incapable of possessing a right of property and control, the con-
queror may, in fact, choose to ignore their title, and proceed to occupy the land as though it were
vacant."). See also L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 47, at 383-84; J. WEsTLAKE, supra note 47, at 155-
60. A series of influential international tribunal awards in the 1920s and 1930s affirmed the position
of the Western positivists that international law did not recognize indigenous territorial rights. See
Legal Status of E. Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5); Island of
Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928); Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.),
6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173 (1926). The cases are discussed in Anaya, supra note 46, at 208-11. It
was not until 1975, in the Western Sahara case, that an international tribunal sought to question the
extreme legal position that indigenous peoples' lands could be regarded as terra nuius for interna-
tional law purposes. The International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion relating to the self-
determination of the former African colony claimed by Spain, decided that:
Whatever differences of opinion there may have been among jurists, the State practice of
the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social
and political organization were not regarded as terrae nuius.
Western Sahara (Morocco v. Spain), 1975 I.CJ. 12, 39 (Oct. 16).
50. A. SNOw, THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF NATIONS 55
(1921); see also M. LINDLEY, supra note 48, at 328-30 (discussing theories of civilized nation's sacred
duty of trust towards "backward" tribes).
51. According to Westlake, the exclusion of indigenous peoples' rights from the concerns of
international law "does not mean that all rights are denied to such natives, but that the appreciation
of their rights is left to the conscience of the state within whose recognized territorial sovereignty
they are comprised, the rules of the international society existing only for the purposes of regulating
the mutual conduct of its members." J. WESTLAKE, supra note 47, at 136. See also G. GONG, THE
STANDARD OF "CIVILIZATION" IN INTERNATIONAL SOcIETY 54-63 (1984) (discussing standards
for membership and inclusion in the civilized "family of nations"); L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 47, at
126 (stating that the law of nations does not apply "to organized wandering tribes").
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were, as one early 20th century Western international tribunal noted,
simply "not a legal unit of international law."'52
III. THE EMERGENCE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Since the 1970s, indigenous groups and their advocates have sought
to challenge the continuing dominance in international legal discourse of
the doctrine of discovery and its conception of diminished indigenous
rights and status. These efforts to transform international legal thought
and doctrine have focused primarily on international human rights bod-
ies. The international human rights process provides many and diverse
forums for indigenous peoples to engage in open dialogue on the effects
of the doctrine of discovery and its related legal principles on indigenous
survival. 53 The highly formalized, standard-setting activities of the
human rights process have provided a sanctuary for indigenous peoples
to practice their belief that, through their stories, they can raise con-
sciousness and redefine the terms of their own survival in the world.
Without doubt, the most important forum to emerge out of the in-
digenous human rights movement in contemporary international law is
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. 54 The
Working Group recently completed its eighth annual session at the
United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, Switzerland in
August 1990.55
Created by the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) in 1982, the Working Group is a unique body within the
institutional human rights structure of the United Nations.56 Its man-
52. Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R. Int'l Arb, Awards 173, 174 (1926) (cited and
discussed in Barsh, Indigenous North America, supra note 4, at 78-79).
53. See generally sources discussed supra note 27.
54. The emergence of the Working Group as a central focus of indigenous human rights stan-
dard-setting activities in the international legal process is described in Hannum, supra note 4, at 660-
62 ("The Working Group has become the primary focus of international activities by both govern-
ments and non-governmental organizations concerned with indigenous peoples."); see also Alfred-
sson, Fourth Session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 55 NORDIC 3. INT'L L. 22
(1986); Barsh, Indigenous North America, supra note 4, at 100-102; Barsh, Emerging Object, supra
note 4, at 369.
55. See Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations on its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2 1990/42 (report on 1990 progress).
56. In 1971, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities appointed Jose R. Martinez Cobo as Special Rapporteur to study the problem of discrimina-
tion against indigenous populations. The multi-volume report, completed in 1983, has been a
principal vehiclefor increased international interest and activity in the indigenous human rights
field. See UN INDIGENOUS STUDY, supra note 4. See generally Hannum, supra note 4, at 658
(discussing the Martinez Cobo Study). The final part of the Study, containing conclusions and rec-
ommendations (printed separately) has been cited as an authoritative "reference work of definitive
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date as a forum devoted exclusively to the survival of indigenous peoples
includes the urgent task of developing international legal standards for
the protection of indigenous peoples' human rights.5 7 Its five members
are drawn from the select group of international law experts sitting on
the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities. With its global agenda and expert
membership, the Working Group represents one of the most important
initiatives undertaken by the institutional standard-setting machinery of
the international human rights process in recent years.58 The Working
Group's annual sessions now are attended regularly by nearly four hun-
dred persons, including representatives from over fifty indigenous organi-
zations and observers from more than two dozen national governments.5 9
The Working Group's annual meeting is a highly structured, formal
event. The week-long session is chaired by a member of the Working
Group to whom all interventions and submissions, written and oral, must
be formally directed. The chair's mediatory functions include the main-
tenance of strict order and proper decorum throughout the process.
Speakers are admonished to respect time limitations and cumulative or
irrelevant interventions occasionally are ruled to be out of order. The
usefulness," Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1984/L.41 para. 4. See also Barsh, Emerging Object, supra note 4, at 371 (discussing
"authoritative" acceptance of the Martinez Cobo Study).
The Martinez Cobo Study's most important conclusions and recommendations focused on the
inadequacy of existing human rights standards in protecting indigenous peoples, the need for a UN
sponsored declaration leading to a convention recognizing, among other indigenous human rights,
the right to indigenous self-determination and territorial rights, and the proposed establishment of a
UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations. 5 UN INDIGENOUS STUDY, supra note 4, at 1-2,
originally released as E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8.
Responding to the Study's recommendations and also to similar recommendations made by a
number of indigenous rights organizations at international conferences throughout the late 1970's
and early 1980s, the UN Commission on Human Rights (Comm'n Res. 1982/19 [Mar. 10]) and
E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 26-27, U.N. Doc. E/1982/82, approved crea-
tion of a pre-sessional Working Group 'on Indigenous Populations of the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. See Barsh, Emerging Object, supra note
4, at 372; Hannum, supra note 4, at 660.
57. The Working Group's original mandate directed it to review developments pertaining to
the promotion and protection of the human rights of indigenous populations and to develop interna-
tional legal standards for indigenous human rights. E.S.C. Res. 34, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at
26-27, U.N. Doc. E./1982/82 (1982); Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/495 (1981).
58. The five members of the Working Group all serve in their individual capacity. Like other
subsidiary bodies within the UN, the Working Group's membership is drawn from the regional five
groups of Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., and Western Europe and
others. See generally Hannum, supra note 4, at 660 (noting that "[m]ost subsidiary bodies such as




chair also performs the important role of reminding all attending at the
session of the seriousness and importance of the Working Group's stan-
dard-setting mandate. Throughout the session, international human
rights instruments and other international legal standards, norms, and
procedures are frequent topics of discussion and form the backdrop
against which the Working Group carries out its mandate. In short, the
Working Group has created a serious public space for encounter and
dialogue, predominated by the high ideals, public values, and formal di-
plomacy of the institutionalized international human rights standard-set-
ting process.60
Within this formal public space, indigenous groups and states are
permitted to speak, addressing their concerns directly to the Working
Group. The Working Group's sessional agenda permits indigenous
human rights groups and advocates to make brief, ten-minute oral inter-
ventions to the chair. These oral reports also can be supported by writ-
ten documents submitted before or during the session. The interventions
usually describe government actions and policies affecting indigenous
peoples' human rights. The indigenous interventions most frequently de-
tail gross abuses of indigenous peoples' most basic human rights, inva-
sions of indigenous territories, assaults on cultural survival, and denial of
self-governing autonomy, and typically occupy a large portion of the
Working Group's week-long agenda.61
States, in turn, are given ample opportunity to respond to both spe-
cific and general indigenous complaints of human rights abuses and also
are given an opportunity to outline existing or proposed policy initiatives
and legal developments. Again, the responses are made directly to the
Chair of the Working Group. Notably, even when vehemently denying
the accuracy or bona fides, of an indigenous intervention, state represent-
atives usually will couch their replies to the chair in the formalities of
diplomatic discourse and appeals to the substantive and procedural
norms of the international human rights process and legal system.62
60. For a discussion of the implications of the Working Group's formalized standard.setting
processes and their role in working to assure fairness for indigenous peoples seeking redress for
violations of their human rights, see infra Part V.
61. Summaries of indigenous interventions regarding governmental actions negatively affecting
indigenous peoples' human rights are contained in the Working Group's sessional reports. See, e.g.,
Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Sixth Session, U.N. ESCOR CN.4,
U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24 (1988) [hereinafter cited as W.G. Report, Sixth Session]. Other
Working Group Reports are found in U.N. Do. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22 (1985) (Fourth Session);
U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/20 (1984) (Third Session); U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22
(1983) (Second Session); U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33 (1982) (First Session).
62. On the implications of these formalized aspects of the Working Group sessions, and their




In recent years, a final part of the Working Group's sessional agenda
has focused increasingly on procedural and substantive aspects of devel-
oping a standard-setting international legal instrument for the protection
and promotion of indigenous peoples' human rights. The information
gathered through the indigenous oral interventions and state submissions
and responses, along with the Working Group members' own considera-
ble expertise in the field of international human rights law, provides the
primary material for the Working Group as it fashions its recommended
draft text for a Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples.63
Despite the highly formalized processes of administering and inves-
tigating its standard-setting mandate, the Working Group has allowed all
indigenous peoples who appear before it to tell their stories in terms that
are meaningful to their own experiences. Representatives from groups
claiming indigenous status have been permitted to present their oral in-
terventions before the Working Group, constrained only by necessary
time limitations and a formal requirement that accusations against a gov-
ernment be presented as factually-based interventions reporting on "de-
velopments" that affect indigenous rights in a particular country.64
The highly formalized standard-setting procedures of the Working
Group permit indigenous peoples to tell their stories in terms that are
meaningful to them. At the same time, the Working Group generally
has chosen not to constrain the information that can be presented by
indigenous peoples during its sessions. Few evidentiary and standing re-
quirements are imposed that work to "screen" information narrowly
deemed "relevant" to the Working Group's fact-finding and standard-
setting tasks.65 The "screening function" of the evidentiary and standing
63. For a more thorough discussion of the Draft Declaration, see infra text accompanying
notes 72-134.
64. Although some indigenous groups and spokespersons have been less than fully satisfied
with the procedures governing their participation at the Working Group, the unprecedented decision
to allow wide participation to all groups and individuals claiming indigenous status has been one of
the most significant and distinctive features of the Working Group's standard-setting activities. Nor-
mally, groups with United Nations recognized formal consultive status are the only non-state actors
allowed to present oral and written interventions to a specialized UN body such as the Working
Group. See Hannum, supra note 4 at 660-61. Professor Hannum notes that:
As a result of this wide participation, the Working Group has provided a meaningful fo-
rum for the exchange of proposals regarding indigenous rights and for the exposition of
indigenous reality throughout the world. While the Working Group reiterates at each ses-
sion that it is not a "chamber of complaints" and has no authority to hear allegations of
human rights violations, it has nevertheless permitted very direct criticisms of government
practices by NGO's [non-governmental organizations] as a means of gathering data upon
which standards will eventually be based.
IL
65. The "screening function" of formal legal standards identified by Delgado and others, see,
eg., Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists, supra note 1, at 2441, is discussed more fully in the
context of the Working Group's standard-setting activities, infra text accompanying notes 71-134.
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barriers that sometimes can prove fatal to the claims of oppressed groups
has not inhibited the participation of indigenous peoples in the Working
Group. 66
Since the Working Group's establishment eight years ago, indige-
nous peoples from all over the world have come to Geneva to speak of
international law's failure to protect their human rights. In Geneva, I
have heard the stories that indigenous peoples have been telling in inter-
national human rights forums for more than a decade.67 I have listened
to indigenous messengers from South America tell of gold miners who
shoot Yanomami Indians from trees in the rainforest for profit-or
worse, just for sport. I have heard of Indian children in the Andes
poisoned by waters contaminated by the chemicals used to process co-
caine. I have listened to indigenous messengers from throughout South
America speak of multinational joint ventures sponsored by settler state
governments and of policies aimed at national economic development
through genocide.
From Central America, indigenous messengers have spoken of the
thousands of indigenous peoples who have fled death squads and wars in
their countries and now crowd into refugee camps along the Mexican
border. I have spoken with indigenous lawyers about the various forms
of political repression exercised against traditional indigenous leaders by
settler state governments. 68
66. Se e g., Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists, supra note 1, at 2143; Torres & Milun,
Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625.
This "screening function" is more thoroughly discussed infra Part V.
67. See, ag., WG Report Sixth Session, supra note 61. These stories can be found documented
in prior Working Group sessional reports, see supra note 61. For an introduction to the nature and
scope of the reports and other literature detailing abuses of indigenous peoples' human rights glob-
ally, see GLOBAL QUEST, supra note 29, at 23-30; Nettheim, "Peoples" and "Populations"--Indige-
nous Peoples and the Rights of Peoples, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 4, at 107. See also
the extensive bibliography of anthropologically-related materials in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTHRO-
POLOGY, supra note 4.
A summary of the major Non-Governmental Organization conferences focusing on indigenous
human rights concerns can be found in 1 UN INDIGENOUS STUDY, supra note 4, at 148-201.
Among the most significant of the conferences attended by indigenous peoples during this period
were the International NGO Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the
Americas 1977 (Sept. 20-24, Geneva); Statement and Final Documents (1978), and the 1981 Interna-
tional NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land (reported at Report of the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1512
(1983)). For accounts of the international activities of indigenous human rights groups, see Barsh,
-Indigenous North America, supra note 4, at 99-102; Barsh, Emerging Object, supra note 4, at 371-72;
Hannum, supra note 4, at 658-60.
68. As just one example, James Anaya, now a law professor at the University of Iowa, and who
represented the Miskito and other Indians of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast in their autonomy negotia-
tions with the Sandinista government, provided me with a translated copy of a letter from the office
of Sandinista Comandante Tomas Borge, "to be signed by Brooklyn Rivera and his group (the
YATAMA Directorate, a Nicaraguan Indian resistance organization) in order to enter the country."
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From the United States, I have heard compelling stories of the
human suffering of four generations of Navajo families'-suffering caused
by the federal government's forced relocation program on Big Moun-
tain.69 I have heard of tribes in the United States where twenty-five per-
cent of the babies born suffer from fetal alcohol abuse syndrome, yet the
United States Indian Health Service does little or nothing to provide ef-
fective prenatal education or care for pregnant Indian women.
In Geneva, I also have heard Indian people from Canada speak of
suicide and unemployment rates in their tribes that are six to eight times
the national average. I heard stories of Indian mothers and their babies
awakened early in the morning by the United States' cruise missiles fly-
ing over indigenous territories which the Canadian government regards
as "vacant." From Australia, New Zealand, and Asia, indigenous peo-
ples have told stories of uncompensated thefts of their territories and de-
struction of their subsistence-oriented, traditional ways of life.
Among the demands that were made by the Sandinistas in this letter to the then exiled Indian
leaders were that they:
Recognize the authorities of the Institutions and the functionaires of the Constitutional
Government of Nicaragua and not promote actions that question its legitimacy.
- Respect the laws or requirements of the Constitutional Government of Nicaragua
that regulate the ingress and distribution of internal or external aid or financing for
whatever type of activity.
*.. Renounce every type of proselytizing activity that calls into question or could
undermine the normal development of the electoral process throughout the national terri-
tory and, in particular, in the autonomous Regions of the North and South of the Atlantic
Coast of Nicaragua.
Letter from Capt. Maria Lourdes Casco to Dr. Gustavio Parajon (June 27, 1989) (available from the
author). This letter, dated June 27, 1989 and signed by an official of the Ministry of Interior (headed
by Commander Borge who had represented the Nicaraguan Sandinista government from an early
point in the Miskito autonomy negotiations) under the caption "A Free Country or Death," was
presented to Rivera and other YATAMA leaders just prior to their planned return from exile to
their country. They refused to sign the letter because the provisions would have hindered fundrais-
ing activities in connection with the Nicaraguan election process. At the close of 1989, the Sandinis-
tas, prodded by former President Jimmy Carter, who was called in to mediate the stalemate, agreed
to drop the objectionable provisions on the conditions of entry. The Miskito leaders returned to
their Atlantic Coast homelands in December 1989 to participate in the February 1990 general elec-
tions, in which the Sandinista leadership was rejected by the Nicaraguan electorate. President-elect
Chamorro had promised substantial autonomy to the Atlantic Coast region's Indian peoples. Nego-
tiations are now being conducted between the new government and the Indian leadership.
The conflict between the Sandinistas and the Miskitos has been reported on by the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, OAS Doe. OEA/Ser. L/
V/II.62, Do. 10 Rev. 3 (1983). A copy of the letter, news release, and other pertinent information
is available from the author upon request.
69. For an assessment of the U.S. government's efforts to relocate traditional Navajo families
residing on lands in the region of Big Mountain, Arizona, see Whitson, A Policy Review of the Fed-
eral Government's Relocation of Navajo Indians under P.L. 95-531 and AL 96-305, 27 AIz. L.
REv. 371 (1985) (concluding that courts and Congress have closed their eyes to problems of Navajo
and Hopi for the past 100 years, to the benefit of certain parties and the expense of American
Indians).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Through such stories told to the Working Group and other interna-
tional human rights forums during the past decade, indigenous peoples
have described the effects of international law's continued adherence to
the European doctrine of discovery. Under the exclusive jurisdiction of
settler state regimes, indigenous peoples' collective rights as distinct peo-
ples with distinct cultural identities have been denied by settler state gov-
ernments. The territories they have traditionally occupied have been
invaded and colonized without compensation. Their self-governing au-
tonomy has been systematically destroyed. Their treaties have been de-
clared legal nullities. Such stories told by indigenous peoples for the past
decade have raised consciousness in international human rights forums
about the continuing genocidal threat of the European doctrine of dis-
covery to the survival of indigenous peoples in the world. And through
the power of their stories, indigenous peoples have begun to transform
legal thought and doctrine about the rights that matter to them under
international law.
IV. MEASURING THE POWER OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' STORIES:
THE WORKING GROUP'S DRAFT UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
ON RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Since its earliest sessions, the Working Group on Indigenous Popu-
lations has provided a vitally important forum for indigenous peoples to
tell their own stories, through oral and written interventions, of the
human rights violations and government practices threatening their sur-
vival. This international forum provides a means of monitoring develop-
ments that affect indigenous rights-a role that remains crucial to the
Working Group's agenda.
As has been mentioned previously, during its more recent sessions7°
the Working Group also has begun to address its other, more difficult
mandated task, that of developing international legal standards for the
promotion and protection of indigenous rights.71 A set of fourteen draft
principles, originally released in 1985,72 has evolved into the First Re-
70. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
71. Although the review of developments related to the human rights of indigenous peoples
continues to form an important segment of the Working Group's activity, since 1985 it has shifted its
focus to preparing a draft declaration on the rights of indigenous populations. From the perspective
of international law, this declaration will probably be the most significant development to date in the
area of indigenous rights. See Hannum, supra note 4, at 661 n.55.
72. See Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fifth Session, at 3-5, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987, Annex II. The Working Group's original draft principles respecting in-
digenous peoples rights recognize:
1. The right to the full and effective enjoyment of the fundamental rights and freedoms
universally recognized in existing international instruments, particularly in the Charter of
the United Nations and the International Bill of Human Rights.
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vised Text of a Draft Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, released at the Working Group's most recent 1989 session and
discussed extensively at its most recent 1990 session.73 The Working
Group's standard-setting activities are intended to result in a final Draft
Declaration to be forwarded ultimately to the UN General Assembly for
ratification.74 Once ratified, the Universal Declaration on Rights of In-
digenous Peoples will assume its place among other authoritative inter-
national human rights instruments in the modem world legal order,75 as
declarative of the international community's minimum legal standards
for the protection of indigenous peoples' human rights to survival. As a
standard-setting instrument for international law purposes, its alternative
discourse of indigenous human rights can be employed in international
legal and political forums around the world, in the UN Commission on
Human Rights, on the floor of the UN General Assembly, or before re-
gional bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. Not only could a United Nations Universal Declaration speak-
ing to indigenous human rights be cited as authority in the international
legal system, it would command attention and response in many domes-
2. The right to be free and equal to all other human beings in dignity and rights, and to be
free from discrimination of any kind.
3. The collective right to exist and to be protected against genocide, as well as the individ-
ual right to life, physical integrity, liberty, and security of person.
4. The collective right to maintain and develop their ethnic characteristics and identity.
5. The collective right to protection against any act which has the aim or effect of depriv-
ing them of their ethnic characteristics or identity. This protection shall include preven-
tion of any form of forced assimilation, any propaganda directed against them, etc.
6. The collective right to participate fully in the economic, political and social life and to
have their specific character reflected in the legal system and in the political institutions of
their country.
7. The duty of the territorial State to grant-within the resources available-the neces-
sary assistance for the maintenance of their identity and their development.
8. The right to special State measures for the immediate, effective and continuing im-
provement of their social and economic conditions, with their consent, that reflect their
own priorities.
9. The right to be secure in the enjoyment of their own traditional means of subsistence,
and to engage freely in their traditional and other economic activities, without adverse
discrimination.
10. The right to determine, plan and implement all health, housing and other social and
economic programs affecting them.
11. The right to manifest, teach, practise and observe their own religious traditions and
ceremonies, and to maintain, protect, and have access to sites for these purposes.
12. The right to all forms of education, including the right to have access to education in
their own languages, and to establish their own educational institutions.
13. The right to preserve their cultural identity and traditions, and to pursue their own
cultural development.
14. The right to promote intercultural information and education, recognizing the dignity
and diversity of their cultures.
73. WG Draft, supra note 13, at 4.
74. See id. at 2 (introductory comments of Chairman-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes).
75. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 27, at 313-60 provides an incisive




tic political and legal arenas as well. Its proscriptions could be used in a
variety of highly-publicized forums by any number of groups and indi-
viduals to challenge state action which threatens the survival of indige-
nous peoples. Perhaps the greatest significance of a Universal
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples is its capacity to translate
the stories told by indigenous peoples of the human rights they want
protected into terms that settler state governments, particularly in the
West, will take seriously.76
The present Draft Declaration provides an important measure of the
power of the stories told by indigenous peoples to transform legal
thought and doctrine. It is worth remembering that the Draft was pre-
pared by the Working Group's Chairman-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene
Daes, a respected expert in the field of international human rights law.77
Mrs. Daes, like the other expert members of the Working Group with
whom she consults on the Draft, is well-versed in international law's pro-
cedural, substantive, and normative discourses. In other words, the
Working Group's standard-setting activities are carried out by experts
familiar with the context of international law's historical denial of indige-
nous rights under principles derived from the doctrine of discovery. 78
Given this fact, it is significant that the Working Group Draft Declara-
tion directly addresses the concerns that have figured most prominently
and consistently in the stories told by indigenous peoples to the Working
Group and other international human rights forums during the past dec-
ade.79 They are the following: (1) the distinctive nature of indigenous
peoples' collective rights; (2) the centrality of territorial rights to indige-
nous survival; (3) the recognition of indigenous peoples' rights to self-
76. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 27, at 179-363 (discussing
authoritative modes of decision for enforcing and promoting human values and dignity as reflected
in international human rights instruments).
77. I have used the form of address indicated by official UN Documents, and preferred by
Chairman-Rapporteur Daes herself. Mrs. Daes, of Greece, is a widely-published and respected
scholar and expert in the field of international law and human rights. See, for example, her leading
studies for the UN: U.N. SUBCOMM'N ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES, THE INDIDUAL's DUTIES TO THE COMMUNITY AND THE LIMITATIONS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS--A CONTRIBUTION TO THE FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL UNDER LAW, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E/82.XIV.1 (1983); U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-
comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorites, Promotion, Protection and Res-
toration of Human Rights at National Regional and International Level: The Status of the
Individual and Contemporary International Law, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/33 (1988) [herein-
after The Status of the Individual]. See also Daes, Native People's Rights, 27 CAHIERS DE DROIT
123 (1986) (discussing international legal aspects of indigenous peoples' rights); Daes, On the Rela-
tions between Indigenous Peoples and States, 2 WrrHOUT PREJUDICE: EAFORD INTELL. REV. OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 41 (1989) (discussing U.N. activities in field of indigenous rights).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 37-52.
79. See, eg., supra notes 61 & 67.
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determining autonomy; and (4) international legal protection of indige-
nous rights. These concerns, not coincidentally, largely have been ig-
nored by the legal discourse derived from the doctrine of discovery, a
discourse that has dominated international legal conceptions of indige-
nous rights for the past five centuries.
A. The Rights That Matter to Indigenous Peoples
1. Collective Rights. Under principles derived from the doctrine
of discovery, indigenous peoples have, at most, been considered entitled
to no greater protection than the protection international law extends to
all individuals in their relations with the state.80 In appearances before
the Working Group and other international human rights forums during
the past decade, however, indigenous peoples have sought to document
the massive failures of existing international law to protect their collective
rights to survival as distinct peoples.81
80. See eg., Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173 (1926). The evolu-
tion of international legal recognition of the rights of the individual under international human
rights law are thoroughly discussed in Daes, supra note 77.
81. The myriad issues raised by indigenous peoples' demands for recognition of their collective
rights in international law are discussed in Barsh, Indigenous North America, supra note 4, at 74-102.
For a discussion of the range of theoretical and practcal problems raised by the concept of collective
rights in international law, see THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 4. The diverse views contained
in the chapters by two of contemporary international law's most powerful voices are particularly
useful. See Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF PEO-
PLES, supra note 4, at 1; Falk, supra note 4, at 17.
There are numerous theoretical and practical problems involved in defining the collective rights
belonging to "peoples" under international law. First, there is no readily identifiable, agreed upon
definition of what constitutes a "people" in the international law sense of the term. Under Art. I,
para. I of both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, entered into force, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1966), the two instruments comprising the United Nations Human Rights Covenants, "[a]ll peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." See generally Crawford,
The Rights of Peoplen" "Peoples" on the Governments?, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 4, at
55, 56-57.
Most commentators are agreed that "peoples cannot simply be identified with States." Makin-
son, Rights of People. Point of View of a Logician, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 4, at 73.
"[Tihe two concepts are different kinds of abstraction. A people is a kind of collectivity, or group of
human beings; a State is a kind of governing and administering apparatus." Id
Despite the generally agreed upon distinction between the two terms, the international legal
system has delicately avoided defining "some general characterization of what is to count as a people
that will serve to distinguish 'peoples' from other 'lesser' kinds of collectivities for whom it is felt that
the right to self-determination cannot reasonably be applied." Id at 74. States have been naturally
fearful of calls for self-determination from groups that might meet some definitional test of pe-
oplehood, and therefore claim a collective right of secession. Such fears have found their embodi-
ment in international human rights legal instruments, which, it should be remembered, are
approved, ratified, and made effective by states in the international legal system. For instance, Arti-
cle 6 of the 1960 UN General Assembly's Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial
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The collective right to exist as distinct peoples with their own cul-
tural identities has been one of the themes voiced most persistently since
1982 by indigenous advocates at the Working Group. 2 In comments on
the First Revised Text of the Draft Declaration, the Indigenous Peoples
Preparatory Meeting, comprised of a number of the indigenous human
rights groups participating at the 1989 Working Group session,8 3 agreed
on the following as a first point of concern relating to the Working
Group's standard-setting activities:
1. The concept of Indigenous peoples' collective rights is of para-
mount importance. It is the establishment of rights of peoples as
groups, and not merely the recognition of individual rights, which is
one of the most important purposes of this Declaration. Without this,
the Declaration cannot adequately protect our most basic interests.
This must not be compromised. 84
The present revised text of the Draft directly addresses this central
concern about the distinctive, collective nature of indigenous peoples'
rights. It affirms basic international law doctrine by guaranteeing indige-
nous peoples all fundamental rights and freedoms in existing interna-
tional instruments.85 These individual rights include the right to be free
Countries and Peoples, a core text of the Third World Decolonization Movement, states in clear
terms that: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the charter of the
United Nations." Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
As Makinson's essay notes, see supra, this strategy of "semantic blockage," by which the recog-
nized collective right of self-determination belonging to a would-be "people" who constitute a sub-
group of a state cannot be reconciled with the unity and territorial integrity of that state, has forced
advocates seeking recognition of indigenous "peoples" human rights "to work with a very much
diluted notion of self-determination, admitting an enormous range of degrees, so that even the least
element of decentralization, evolution, or federalization is counted as constituting some measure of
self-determination." Id. at 75-76.
It is in the context of this type of "diluted notion of self-determination" that indigenous peoples
have asserted their collective rights as "peoples." See generally Nettheim, supra note 67, at 107-26:
[I]nternational law ought to be sufficient in principle to meet the autonomy claims of indig-
enous peoples... With careful thought it may therefore be possible to devise a concept of
self-determination which, while not embracing the possibility of complete independence
against the wish of the encompassing national State, does permit as wide a range of other
forms of association as the self-determining people might select.
Id at 120.
82. See supra note 61.
83. Indigenous Peoples' Preparatory Meeting, Comments on the First Revised Text of the
Draft Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (July 28, 1989) (available from author).
84. Id at 1.
85. WG Draft, supra note 13, at 5. Paragraph 1 declares the following rights belonging to
indigenous peoples: "The right to the full and effective enjoyment of all fundamental rights and
freedoms, as well as the observance of the corresponding responsibilities, which are universally rec-
ognized in the Charter of the United Nations and in existing international human rights
instruments."
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from "adverse distinction or discrimination of any kind."' 86 But the
Draft goes well beyond this relatively noncontroversial recognition of the
individual human rights belonging to all indigenous peoples. The con-
cept of collective rights, which has figured so prominently in the dis-
course of indigenous rights in international law during the past decade,87
holds a prominent place in the Working Group Draft as a basic structur-
ing principle of a Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
As explained by its principal author, Mrs. Daes, the present Draft seeks
to protect indigenous peoples' individual and collective rights, "with a
special emphasis on the latter [collective rights] as an inherent and essen-
tial element of indigenous rights."88
The Draft Declaration's express recognition of indigenous peoples'
collective right "to exist as distinct peoples and to be protected against
genocide," 89 would redefine significantly the terms of indigenous peoples'
status under international law. International legal discourse historically
has been dominated by a conception of indigenous rights derived from
the European doctrine of discovery, which denies to indigenous peoples
any distinct identity worth preserving under international law.90 The
Draft Declaration's greatest significance, from the historical perspective
of indigenous peoples' rights and status under international law, is its
legitimation and affirmation of the value of protecting indigenous peo-
ples' ways of life and cultures per se. As stated in the Working Group's
1988 report explaining the need for international legal recognition of in-
digenous peoples' collective rights, "The harsh lessons of past history
showed that recognition of individual rights alone would not suffice to
uphold and guarantee the continued dignity and distinctiveness of indige-
nous societies and cultures." 91
The specific collective rights recognized in the Draft Declaration
demonstrate the power of the stories told by indigenous peoples to illus-
trate for the Working Group the "harsh lessons of past history." The
Draft recognizes the "collective" rights of indigenous peoples to main-
86. Mad at 5.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 61 & 80-82.
88. .G. Report, Sixth Session, supra note 61, at 18, para. 68.
89. WGDraft, supra note 13, at 6, para. 3. The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, refers specifically to members of ethnic, racial and
religious groups, and prohibits "killing members of the group... ; [d]eliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part... ;
[i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within the group ... ; [and] forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group." G.A. Res. 960(III)A, 9 U.N. GAOR at 174 (1948), in
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, art. II, 78
U.N.T.S. 277, 279.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 37-52.
91. .G. Report Sixth Session, supra note 61, at 21, para. 77.
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tain and develop their ethnic and cultural characteristics and distinct
identities through their own traditions, religions, languages, and educa-
tional systems.92 Besides affirming indigenous peoples' rights to be pro-
tected against genocide under international law, the Draft Declaration
also recognizes the need for the collective rights of indigenous peoples to
be protected against ethnocide. Ethnocide is defined in the Draft as in-
cluding "any act which has the aim or effect of depriving them [indige-
nous peoples] of their ethnic characteristics or cultural identity [or] any
form of forced assimilation or integration, [such as the] imposition of
foreign life-styles." '93
Throughout the past decade, indigenous peoples have consistently
voiced their major concern that genocide- and ethnocide-at-law have
been the only consistent features of the indigenous policies adopted by
settler state regimes governed by the European doctrine of discovery. 94
Responding directly to this principal concern, which also has been reiter-
ated continually before the Working Group, the Draft Declaration recog-
nizes the distinct, collective nature of indigenous rights, and thus would
transform the status of indigenous peoples under international law. In
offering the protection of the international legal system to indigenous col-
lective rights, the Working Group Draft would redefine the legal terms of
indigenous peoples' cultural survival.
2. Territorial Rights. The central principle derived from the Eu-
ropean doctrine of discovery in contemporary international legal dis-
course relates to indigenous territorial rights.95 Under the doctrine, as
elaborated by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 96 Europe-
ans acquired exclusive rights and control over territories they discovered
even if the land were already occupied by indigenous peoples. Upon dis-
covery, indigenous peoples' "rights to complete sovereignty, as independ-
ent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of
the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied."'97
Subsequent Western legal theorists extended the discovery doctrine's
scope to deny any indigenous rights to traditionally occupied territories
under international law. Until very recently, in fact, the dominant inter-
92. See WG Draft, supra note 13, at 6, para. 6, 8, 9, 10. Paragraph 7 of the Draft requires that
states grant "within the resources available," the necessary assistance for the maintenance of indige-
nous peoples' identity and cultural development. Id. at 6, para. 7.
93. Id. at 6, para. 5.
94. See, eg., Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native
American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REv. 713, 754-55 (1986) (discussing the general problem of the
doctrine of discovery and indigenous peoples' hostility to settler state intransigence).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 37-52.
96. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
97. Id at 574.
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national legal discourse of this century regarded indigenous territories as
terra nuius; that is, as lands without an owner.98
In their many stories told in Geneva and other international human
rights forums, indigenous peoples have emphasized that the spiritual and
material foundations of their cultural identities are sustained by their
unique relationships to their traditional territories. They consistently
have argued that international legal recognition of indigenous peoples'
collective human rights to exist as distinct peoples pursuing their own
cultural development and identity would mean little without a corre-
sponding recognition of the collective nature of indigenous rights to oc-
cupy traditional territories. 99
At the Working Group's fourth session in 1985, for example, a
group of twenty-two indigenous human rights organizations jointly sub-
mitted a proposed draft declaration of indigenous rights for the Working
Group's consideration. The draft declaration sought international legal
recognition of the special relationship of indigenous peoples to their
lands and protection for indigenous territorial rights under international
law. The proposed draft specifically challenged the continuing accept-
ance in international law of the Western settler states' asserted exclusive
rights over indigenous territories derived under the doctrine of discovery.
The proposed draft asserted that "[d]iscovery, conquest, settlement on a
theory of terra nullius and unilateral legislation are never legitimate ba-
ses for States to claim or retain the territories of indigenous nations or
peoples."'I0°
The Working Group's Draft Declaration on Indigenous Peoples'
Rights incorporates many of the major themes of the emerging discourse
of indigenous territorial rights in international law. The Draft specifi-
cally recognizes the "collective" right of indigenous peoples to "owner-
ship, possession and uses of the lands and resources which they have
traditionally occupied or used." 101 Significantly, the Working Group's
rejection of the European doctrine of discovery as a legitimate basis for
98. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
99. As Nettheim notes in his essay, given the unique, all-encompassing and sustaining relation-
ship indigenous peoples have with their traditional territories, recognition of indigenous peoples'
land rights must be seen as the modus vivendi for assuring their continuing cultural survival. Indige-
nous culture, religion and, oftentimes, even language, are intimately bound up with indigenous peo-
ples' continuing relationships with their land. Nettheim, supra note 67, at 116-17. Various aspects
of indigenous peoples land rights are discussed extensively in 4 UN INDIGENOUS STuDY, supra note
4, at 4-203, and in GLOBAL QUEST, supra note 29, at 43-67.
100. The Indigenous Organizations' Draft Declaration is reproduced in Annexes III and IV of
the Report of the Fourth Session of the Working Group, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22 (1985),
quoted in Barsh, Emerging Object, supra note 4, at 380.




determining indigenous territorial rights in international law is stated in
plain terms. Indigenous peoples, according to the present wording of the
Draft, possess the right to,
reclaim land and surface resources or where this is not possible, to seek
just and fair compensation for the same, when the property has been
taken away from them without consent, in particular, if such deprival
has been based on theories such as those related to discovery, terra
nullius, waste lands, or idle lands. 102
Further, States are required to provide "special measures" to ensure in-
digenous peoples' ownership and control over surface resources of their
traditionally-occupied territories. For example, "flora and fauna, waters
and ice sea" are specifically included among those resources entitled to
special state protection measures. 103
The Working Group Draft Declaration does not explicitly recognize
indigenous peoples' ownership and control over the natural resources lo-
cated beneath their traditional territories. It does, however, recognize a
right on the part of indigenous peoples to protection of their environment
"in particular against any action or course of conduct which may result
in the destruction, deterioration or pollution" of their traditional lands
and surface resources. 104 This right is made effective by requiring indige-
nous peoples' consent and "just and fair compensation" for any such ac-
tion or course of conduct resulting in environmental degradation of their
territories.10 5 Additionally, the Draft Declaration requires that states
consult with indigenous peoples and with both domestic and transna-
tional corporations prior to the commencement of any "large-scale" min-
eral and subsurface development project affecting indigenous peoples and
their territories, "in order to enhance the projects' benefits and to miti-
gate any adverse economic, social, environmental and cultural effect." 106
The Working Group Draft requires that indigenous peoples be given
12. The right of collective and individual ownership, possession and use of the lands or
resources which they have traditionally occupied or used. The lands may only be taken
away from them with their free and informed consent as witnessed by a treaty or
agreement.
13. The right to recognition of their own land-tenure systems for the protection and pro-
motion of the use, enjoyment and occupancy of the land.
Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 7, para. 15. This section of the Draft goes on to state that compensation, "if the
parties agree, may take the form of land or resources of quality and legal status at least equal to that
of the property previously owned by them." Id.
103. Id. at 7, para. 14.
104. Id. at 7, para. 16.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 7, para. 17. Under the Draft, states are required to,
consult with indigenous peoples and with both domestic and transnational corporations
prior to the commencement of any large-scale projects, particularly natural resource
projects or exploitation of mineral and other subsoil resources in order to enhance the
projects' benefits and to mitigate any adverse economic, social, environmental and cultural
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"just and fair compensation" for adverse effects resulting from any large-
scale resource development projects on or beneath their lands. 10 7
These environmental mitigation and compensation requirements in
the Draft Declaration seek to mandate effective state protection measures
for indigenous peoples' recognized ownership and control rights over the
surface and surface resources of their traditional territories. At the same
time, the Working Group apparently has sought to avoid the sensitive
political and legal issues raised by traditional state assertions of sover-
eignty and national control over minerals and other subsurface natural
resources located in indigenous territories. The balance of these provi-
sions, however, tilts clearly toward protection and priority of the human
rights belonging to the indigenous peoples who live on the surface of
those territories.
The Draft's prescriptions relating to indigenous peoples' collective
rights to their lands and resources essentially would delegitimate the five-
hundred-year-old legacy of the European doctrine of discovery. Rejec-
tion of the racially inspired, colonial-era legal principle that indigenous
peoples possess no rights in their traditionally occupied territories has
figured prominently in the emerging discourse of indigenous rights
voiced at international human rights forums during the past decade.
Under the terms of the Working Group Draft Declaration, indigenous
peoples' oft-repeated concern that their distinct cultural identity and
existence depends on protection of their unique relationship to their
traditional territories has been translated into a central principle of indig-
enous peoples' human rights under modern international law.
3. Self-Determination Rights. The theme of indigenous self-de-
termination as a fundamental human right represents the most significant
challenge to present conceptions of international law posed by the emerg-
ing discourse of indigenous human rights.'08 Under the European doc-
effect. Just and fair compensation shall be provided for any such activity or adverse conse-
quence undertaken.
107. IM.
108. See Hannum, supra note 4, at 672; according to Professor Hannum:
Self-determination does imply the right, although not the necessity, of independent state-
hood, and governments tend to equate all demands for self-determination with indepen-
dence and secession. Insistence on this formulation, even when an indigenous group
desires a status less than full independence, may inhibit the resolution of claims that are
not as wholly incompatible as they first appear. Given the limited circumstances in which
international law has thus far recognized the concept, negative government reactions to
indigenous demands for self-determination are not surprising.
See also Falk, supra note 4, at 18:
Characteristically, indigenous peoples claim to possess sovereign rights of their own and a
nationality that is based on history, tradition, and self-identification. The practical conse-
quences for rights of property, for obligations to pay taxes or serve in the military, for
Vol. 1990:660]
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trine of discovery, Western settler states unilaterally denied indigenous
peoples' rights to complete sovereignty over their territories109 Since
Justice Marshall's elaboration of this principle in Johnson, Western legal
systems have extended the denial of indigenous self-determination far be-
yond the doctrine's original limitation to indigenous peoples' "power to
dispose of the soil at their own will to whomsoever they pleased." 110 Set-
tler states in the Americas, New Zealand, and Australia have denied in-
digenous peoples the right to practice their own religions, speak their
own languages, teach their own children, engage in their traditional
means of subsistence, and govern their lives according to their own tradi-
tions and institutions.11
In the United States, where the doctrine of discovery has received its
most refined articulation as a conqueror's regime of law, the United
States Supreme Court in recent years has consistently interpreted the ple-
nary power of the federal government over Indian affairs to mean that
"all aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Con-
gress."' 1 2 Acting under its plenary power derived from the doctrine, the
United States federal government has authorized (among other genocidal
and ethnocidal initiatives) the destruction of Indian religious sites and
practices, suppression of traditional forms of tribal government, forced
removal of Indian children from their homes, uncompensated seizure of
treaty-protected resources, and involuntary sterilization of Indian
women. 113
governmental allegiance and education, are manifest and manifold. Controversy, even
resistance, is the unavoidable result.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 37-52.
110. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823).
111. See supra note 4.
112. Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. LaJolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 788 n.30
(1984); See also National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 &
n.10 (1985); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). For discussions of the cited
phrase's frequent deployment in recent United States Supreme Court cases, see Ball, Constitution,
Court, Indian Thbes, 1987 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3, 49; R. Williams, Learning Not to Live With
Eurocentric Myopia:" A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of
Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 Aluz. L. REv. 439, 446 n.31 (1988).
113. See, eg., Strickland, supra note 94, at 721-48 (documents the manner in which "a culture
was deliberately obliterated"). For a recent arguable example of United States genocide- and ethno-
dide-at-law directed at Indian religious beliefs, see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Lyng overturned a lower court affirmance for the respondents' (Yurok,
Karok, and Tolawa Indians) claim that federal government intrusions on the Indians' sacred reli-
gious sites "are... potentially destructive of the very core of Northwest [Indian] religious beliefs and
practices." 565 F. Supp. 586, 594-95 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Compare the 1948 UN Genocide Conven-
tion which defines "genocide" as an act intended "to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethni-
cal, racial or religious group as such... [c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group." G.A. Res. 960(III)A, 9 U.N. GAOR at 174 (1948), in Convention on Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 279 (emphasis added).
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International legal recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to
self-determination as distinct peoples has been the most strident and per-
sistently declared demand voiced before the Working Group. One of the
most detailed and aggressive formulations of this demand is found in the
1985 Draft Declaration of Principles (Principles) proposed by a group of
major indigenous human rights organizations with non-governmental or-
ganization (NGO) consultative status before the United Nations:
All indigenous nations and peoples have the right to self-determina-
tion, by virtue of which they have the right to whatever degree of au-
tonomy or self-government they choose. This includes the right to
The Working Group Draft Declaration defines ethnocide as "any act... depriving [indigenous
peoples] of their ethnic characteristics or cultural identity." WG Draft, supra note 13, at 6, para. 5.
Officially sanctioned and implemented assaults on traditional tribal governments and cultures
throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries are critically examined in F. HOxiE, A FINAL
PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS (1984).
As one commentator has noted, the forced separation of Indian children from their homes has
been official policy of white governments in North America, "[e]ven before this country was a na-
tion." Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 51 (1979). The policy
continued into the 19th century. See id. at 52. Even in this century, "[s]urveys of states with large
Indian populations conducted by the Association on American Indian Affairs in 1969 and 1974
indicate that approximately 25-35% of all Indian children are separated from their families and
placed in foster homes or other institutions." Id. at 53. As one state court recognized, congressional
hearings leading to passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1934, see
H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978),
revealed a pattern of discrimination Against American Indians in child welfare and child
custody. Testimony indicated that for decades officials had removed a disproportionately
large number of Indian children from their homes and reservations, and had placed them
in non-Indian homes and that many of the removals were unwarranted because officials
showed too little deference to Indian cultural norms and denied due process in child cus-
tody proceedings. These practices deprived many children of their tribal and cultural heri-
tage.
In the Matter of the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. 5-903, 130 Ariz. 202, 203, 635 P.2d
187, 188, cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
On the United States' systemic abrogation of Indian treaties throughout the late 19th century,
see F. HOXIE, supra.
Finally, federal government officials of the United States Indian Health Service continue to
defend policies permitting the involuntary sterilization of Indian women. See Cook, Masterson &
Trahant, Fraud in Indian Country: A Billion Dollar Betrayal, Arizona Republic, Oct. 4-11, 1987
(series running daily for one week). The following excerpt appeared in the Arizona Republic's
award-winning series:
The Indian Health Service for years has injected some mentally handicapped Indian wo-
men with the drug Depo-Provera to prevent them from menstruating or becoming
pregnant.
The Food and Drug Administration has twice denied approval for that long-acting
hormonal drug as a contraceptive because it caused cancer in lab animals.
The Arizona Republic revealed the IHS' use of Depo-Provera on handicapped Indian
women in a 1986 investigation that prompted a congressional hearing this year where one
congressman called the IHS practice a "frightening prospect."
However, the IHS director, Dr. Everett Rhoades, has defended the injections.
Cook, Masterson & Trahaut, IHS Physicians Faulty or Frayed; Shortage Looms, Arizona Republic,
Oct 7, 1987, at AI5, A18, col. 1. See also Killing Our Future: Sterilization and Experiments,
AxWESASNE NOTES, Spring 1977, at 4 (discussing sterilization of native women in the United States
and abroad, and the rationale behind this activity).
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freely determine their political status, freely pursue their own eco-
nomic, social, religious and cultural development, and determine their
own membership and/or citizenship, without external interference.1 14
The Indigenous NGO Draft Declaration of Principles goes on to imply a
right of indigenous secession and denies the jurisdiction of any state over
an indigenous people or its territory "except in accordance with the
freely expressed wishes" of the people concerned. The Principles boldly
assert the right of indigenous peoples to "engage in self-defense against
state actions in conflict with their right to self-determination." ' s
The present Draft Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights re-
sponds to a number of the major demands of indigenous peoples for rec-
ognition of their right to self-determining autonomy. Operating within
the broader framework of indigenous collective rights animating the en-
tire text, the Draft's autonomy provisions recognize the right of indige-
nous peoples "to be secure in the enjoyment of their own traditional
means of subsistence, and to engage freely in their traditional and other
economic activities.... In no case may an indigenous people be deprived
of its means of subsistence."'1 6 The Draft Declaration also mandates
just compensation for deprivation of indigenous peoples' right to main-
tain their traditional way of life1 7 as well as special state measures for
improving indigenous peoples' socioeconomic conditions. Such state
measures, however, can be implemented only with the consent of indige-
nous peoples and must reflect their own priorities.118
Besides these enumerated autonomy rights, the Draft Declaration
recognizes indigenous peoples' right to have "their specific character
duly reflected" in the state's legal system and in political and socioeco-
nomic institutions of the state. According to the Draft, the structure of
these institutions should give "proper regard to and recognition of indig-
enous laws and customs."119 The Draft also recognizes indigenous peo-
114. Draft Declaration of Principles proposed by the Indian Law Resource Center, Four Direc-
tions Council, National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service, National Indian Youth Council, In-
uit Circumpolar Conference, and the International Indian Treaty Council, reprinted in Report of the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fourth Session, Annex IV, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1985/22 (1985).
115. I.
116. WGDraft, supra note 13, at 7, para. 18.
117. Id.
118. See iL at 7, para. 19. The Draft also guarantees indigenous peoples the right "to determine,
plan and implement all health, housing and other social and economic programmes affecting them,
and as far as possible to develop, plan and implement such programmes through their own institu-
tions." Id. at 7, para. 20.
119. Id at 7, para. 21. The wording of this section recognizes indigenous peoples'
right to participate on an equal footing with all the other citizens and without adverse dis-
crimination in the political, economic and social life of the State and to have their specific
character duly reflected in the legal system and in political and socio-economic institutions,
including in particular proper regard to and recognition of indigenous laws and customs.
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pies' right to participate fully at the state level through self-chosen
representatives in decisionmaking about and implementation of all na-
tional and international matters which may affect their life and
destiny.120 Their cultural autonomy rights are expressly recognized "in
matters relating to their own internal and local affairs, including educa-
tion, information, culture, religion, health, housing social welfare, tradi-
tional and often economic activities, land and resources administration
and the environment." 121
The Working Group Draft falls far short of recognizing a right of
secession as formulated by some advocates of the emerging discourse of
indigenous rights in international law. But the Draft nonetheless re-
sponds meaningfully to the repeated demands of indigenous peoples for
international legal recognition of their human rights through increased
autonomy in defining the terms of their survival within the legal and
political systems of their settler state governments. The Draft's auton-
omy provisions therefore significantly redefine many of the dominant
conceptions of modern international law that fail to recognize any degree
or aspect of the fundamental human right of self-determination belong-
ing to indigenous peoples.
4. International Legal Status. Contemporary international legal
discourse denies international legal status to indigenous peoples.' 22 This
denial of status was explained by one 20th century Western international
tribunal speaking with reference to American Indians but announcing
the general rule applicable to all indigenous peoples colonized by West-
ern settler states:
From the time of the discovery of America the Indian tribes have been
treated as under the exclusive protection of the power which by discov-
ery or conquest or cession held the land which they occupied.... So
far as an Indian Tribe exists as a legal unit, it is by virtue of the domes-
tic law of the sovereign within whose territory the tribe occupies the
land, and so far only as that law recognizes it.
123
Denial of international legal status to indigenous peoples holds
many practical as well as theoretical implications in contemporary inter-
national law.1 24 For example, the International Court of Justice and
120. See id. at 8, para. 22.
121. Id at 8, par. 23.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
123. Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173, 309 (1926).
124. Some of these implications are more thoroughly discussed in Alfredsson, supra note 29
(examines the limited remedies and avenues of redress available to indigenous peoples); Barsh, Indig-
enous North America, supra note 4, at 80-102 (examining denial of international legal status to indig-
enous peoples as reflected in the assimilationist premise and various human rights covenants);
Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans under
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many other more effective and high-profile forums of international law
are available only to states-a term which under present conceptions of
international law, does not include indigenous peoples. 125 Related and
just as significant is the fact that the failure to recognize indigenous peo-
ples as formal subjects of international law's benefits and duties contrib-
utes significantly to the undermining of respect and enforceability of the
hundreds of treaties between indigenous peoples and Western states.126
Europeans and European-derived governments have negotiated
treaties with indigenous peoples since the beginnings of their encounters
nearly five hundred years ago. These treaties, written in the languages of
Europeans and preserved in the oral traditions and signifying texts of
indigenous peoples, consistently recognize and affirm indigenous self-de-
termination and territorial rights. Further, these treaties normally were
conducted with indigenous peoples according to the various practices
and protocols appropriate to subjects of international law's benefits and
duties. 127
Despite the existence of these treaties confirming at least some de-
gree of recognition of indigenous self-determination and territory in in-
ternational customary law and negotiated in accordance with the rules,
principles, and protocols followed by European and European-derived
nations in their relations with each other, contemporary international
law does not regard these texts as holding any international legal signifi-
International Law, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 669 (1978) (the United States violates international law
when it curtails the sovereignty of American Indians); Note, Self-Determination: Indians and the
United Nations-The Anomalous Status of America's "Domestic Dependent Nations," 8 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 97 (1980) (arguing that the failure of the domestic trusteeship over Indian nations necessi-
tates international recognition).
125. See generally Barsh, Indigenous North America, supra note 4, at 80-102 (discussing the
effects of denial of formal international legal status for indigenous peoples). According to the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, a part of the UN Charter, "[o]nly States may be parties in cases
before the International Court of Justice." U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFORMATION, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE at 6, U.N. Doc. DPI/780-41027, U.N. Sales No. E.83.I.20 (1983). Rus-
sel Barsh cites two cases brought by North American Indian tribes before the ICY in which the
Court refused to exercise jurisdiction. Barsh, Indigenous North America, supra note 4, at 98.
126. See Barsh, Indigenous North America, supra note 4, at 96-98 (discussing Canada's denial of
international legal status of its treaties with Indian nations).
127. For a compilation of the numerous treaties, cessions, deeds of sale and agreements negoti-
ated between indigenous peoples and the agents of European nations in the present day United
States, see EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS 1607-1789 (A. Vaughan
gen. ed. 1979); KAPPLER'S INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (1979). For an analysis of
treaties involving indigenous peoples in Canada which includes citations to various collections of
documents, see Barsh & Henderson, Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and Human Rights: Indian
Tribes and Constitutional Renewal, 17 J. CANADIAN STUD. 55 (1982). For New Zealand, The
Treaty of Waitangi (1840) can be found reprinted in WArrANGi, supra note 46, at 316-21. See
generally National Indian Youth Counsel, supra note 46, at 1-6 (discussing Indian treaties and their
historical status in international legal discourse).
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cance. Under the European doctrine of discovery, the indigenous party
to the treaty is not entitled to the rights and obligations of sovereign
states as subjects of international law. 128 Rather, as explained by Canada
in response to the Mikmaq Indian Nation's efforts to bring its grievances
before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, indigenous
128. Again, the Western positivists share a good part of the responsibility for the dominance of
this particular negative view of indigenous rights in contemporary international legal discourse. See,
eg., W.E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (P. Higgins 8th ed. 1924). Hall expressed
the general consensus of the Western positivists on the non-substantive legal significance of Euro-
pean dealings with less civilized peoples. Despite written treaties and other formal indicia of seem-
ing statehood under European conceptions of international law, Hall's treatise denied international
legal significance to such acts between Europeans and indigenous peoples:
States outside European civilization must formally enter into the circle of law-governed
countries. They must do something with the acquiescence of the latter, or of some of them,
which amounts to an acceptance of the law in its entirety beyond all possibility of miscon-
struction. It is not enough consequently that they shall enter into arrangements by treaty
identical with arrangements made by law-governed powers, nor that they shall do acts, like
sending and receiving permanent embassies, which are compatible with ignorance or rejec-
tion of law.
Ia at 47-48. As James Anaya points out in insightful fashion in his article, The Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, supra note 46, at 193-97, the Western positivists were much concerned about the interna-
tional legal significance of indigenous treaties. These written texts and their formalities could not be
simply ignored by the positivists because they were, after all, part of the datum of European state
practice. Id.
Professor Charles Alexandrowicz has demonstrated in two very valuable studies that European
state practice recognized the sovereignty, territorial rights, and international status of a large variety
and range of non-European civilizations and cultures for at least three centuries prior to the Western
positivist era. See C.H. ALEXANDROWICZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES (1967) [hereinafter C. ALEXANDROWICZ, EAST INDIES]; C.H. ALE-
XANDROwICZ, THE EUROPEAN-AFRICAN CONFRONTATION: A STUDY IN TREATY MAKING 18-28
(1973). Further, the classic era writers of the European law of nations such as Grotius, Puffendorf,
and Vattel all "concerned themselves with the problems of relations between Christian and non-
Christian powers and the applicability of the law of nations to transactions between them." C. ALE-
XANDROWICZ, EAST INDIES, supra, at 3. Their works clearly confirmed European treaty and diplo-
matic practice and its treatment of non-European societies as subjects of international law. National
Indian Youth Counsel, supra note 46, at 9-24.
The positivists' response to this empirical evidence of subject status for such a wide variety of
less-civilized entities in international law represented, in essence, an epistemological turn. The less-
civilized, it was frequently noted, could not possibly understand the European law of nations, and
therefore they could not be subject to its benefits and duties. With respect to a treaty negotiated
between European states and less-civilized entities, therefore, the natives presumptively could not
understand what they were signing.
This positivist view can be found prominently displayed in the Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v.
Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 831 (1928). This international arbitration involved competing claims
to the Island of Palmas between the United States and the Netherlands. The Netherlands' treaties
and cessions with native rulers were not regarded as dispositive on the issue of sovereign rights to the
island, though the United States could only claim a derived title on the basis of a claim of prior
discovery of the inhabited island by Spain. The arbitration tribunal declared that "contracts between
a state ... and native princes of chiefs of peoples not recognized as members of the community of
nations... are not, in the international law sense, treaties or conventions capable of creating rights
and obligations. Id at 858. Similar views can be found expressed in L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 47,
at 383-90; J. WESTLAKE, supra note 47, at 143-55.
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peoples are under the exclusive jurisdictional power of the European set-
tler state party to the treaty:
International, American and Canadian law do not recognize treaties
with North American Native People as international documents con-
firming the existence of these tribal societies as independent and sover-
eign states. These treaties are merely considered to be nothing more
than contracts between a sovereign and a group of its subjects. 129
The denial of international legal status to indigenous peoples and
their treaties with States has been a principal topic of concern through-
out the Working Group's sessions. Indigenous groups consistently have
emphasized the importance of international legal protection of their
unique status as distinct groups with collective rights. They have focused
on their treaties as documents providing recognition and affirmation, not
only of their international legal capacity but also of their rights to terri-
tory and self-determination in international law. Their treaties with
Western nations, they have argued, confirm their rights to a distinct sta-
tus as subjects of the world's international law. 130
The emerging legal discourse of indigenous rights speaks powerfully
to the question of the international legal status of indigenous peoples and
their treaties. According to a 1988 indigenous NGO statement to the
Working Group,
[T]he solemnity and sacredness of treaties should be underlined.
... [l]t is essential to recognize the historical significance and
continuing relevance of treaties in formalizing relations of indigenous
peoples with States and in promoting mutual trust, honour and
respect.
Treaty-making is a distinct and important element, unique to in-
digenous peoples-no other peoples and Nations, aside from Nation-
States, enter into treaties with State governments. 131
The Working Group Draft Universal Declaration incorporates sev-
eral separate provisions that taken together would redefine the formal
status of indigenous peoples and their treaties under international law.
The Draft Declaration specifically recognizes the right of indigenous peo-
ples "to claim that States honor treaties and other agreements concluded
with indigenous peoples." 132 Although the word "claim" can be read to
stand for merely some type of formal right to ask that states honor their
129. Response of the Government of Canada to the Mikmaq Nation's Greivance to the UN
Human Rights Commission (1981), reprinted in Barsh, Indigenous North America, supra note 4, at
97.
130. See generally supra note 4; WG Report, Sixth Session, supra note 61, at 25-30, paras. 96-112
(outlining study to be undertaken by Working Group member Miguel Alfonso Martinez on treaties
and other constructive arrangements between states and indigenous populations).
131. INurr CiRCUMPOLAR CONFERENCE STATEMENT ON TREATY STUDY OUTLINE 1 (1988).
132. WG Draft supra note 13, at 8, para. 28.
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treaties with indigenous peoples, the term should be read in the context
of the Declaration's closely related recognition of where indigenous peo-
ples can "claim" a right to treaty enforcement. The present Working
Group Draft specifically recognizes indigenous peoples' collective right
to access and prompt decision "by mutually acceptable and fair proce-
dures for resolving disputes." 133 These procedures, according to the
Draft Declaration, should include negotiations, arbitration and national
courts in the domestic sphere, as well as "international and regional
human rights review and complaints mechanisms."' 34 When linked to
the right to "claim" that states honor their treaties with indigenous peo-
ples, this broadly stated right of access to international human rights fo-
rums in particular could be used to bring indigenous peoples and their
treaties within the protective scope of the international legal system. In-
terpreted this way, the Draft Declaration redefines indigenous peoples
and their treaties as subjects of potential international legal concern and
authoritative decisionmaking processes.
The Draft Declaration's recognition of indigenous international
legal status indicates the power of the stories told by indigenous peoples
to transform legal thought and doctrine. For nearly a decade in their
appearances before international human rights bodies such as the Work-
ing Group, indigenous peoples have sought to show that their survival in
the world cannot be protected if international law continues to regard
them as objects of the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of their settler state
governments. Now under the terms of the Working Group Draft Decla-
ration, indigenous peoples and their collective human rights would be
redefined as subjects of direct concern to the international community
and its "civilized" family of nations.
V. CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORKING GROUP
DRAFT UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
The First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on
Rights of Indigenous Peoples has been described by its principal author,
chairman-Rapporteur of the Working Group, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes as
133. Id. According to the full wording of the text, indigenous peoples are recognized as
possessing:
The individual and collective right to access to and prompt decision by mutually accepta-
ble and fair procedures for resolving conflicts or disputes and any infringement, public or
private, between States and indigenous peoples, groups or individuals. These procedures
should include, as appropriate, negotiations, mediation, arbitration, national courts and





"a realistic approach to the issues," constituting "a fair balance between
the aspirations of indigenous peoples and the legitimate concern of
States." 135 Even so, the present Draft Declaration, as Mrs. Daes con-
cedes, has generated "a diversity of opinions," which have become evi-
dent "in the observations made by the Governments, on the one hand,
and by indigenous organizations, on the other, in particular on provisions
as to land and resources rights, self-government and self-autonomy."1 36
Despite these differences, Daes has insisted that all future substantial
changes to the Draft "have to be acceptable to all parties concerned."1 37
Without doubt, therefore, the debates in Geneva between govern-
ments and indigenous peoples on the standard-setting efforts of the
Working Group represent one of the most important encounters occur-
ring on the frontiers of international human rights law. Eventual adop-
tion by the General Assembly of the Working Group's Draft Declaration
could provide a unique stimulus to the contemporary global movement
for recognition, protection, and promotion of indigenous peoples' human
rights. 138
The Draft's broad scope of recognition for indigenous human rights
already addresses many of the more serious concerns raised since 1982 by
indigenous peoples during the course of their interventions to the Work-
ing Group.139 Although the present Draft likely will undergo substan-
tive revision and refinement of terms, the core concepts of indigenous
peoples' collective rights, territorial rights, self-determining autonomy
rights, and international legal status have been firmly recognized by the
Working Group as indispensable elements of any international legal in-
strument devoted to the protection of indigenous peoples' survival. 140 As
evidenced by the Draft Declaration itself, through their stories told in
Geneva and in other human rights forums during the past decade, indige-
nous peoples have begun to redefine the terms of their survival in interna-
tional law.
135. WG Draft, supra note 13, at 3.
136. Id.
137. Id. The comments on the Working Group Draft Declaration submitted by states and indig-
enous organizations contained in Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Analytical Compilation
of Observations and Comments, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33/Add.1 (1989) [hereinafter Ana-
lytical Compilation], provide an excellent overview of the diversity of opinions.
138. In the words of Professor Hannum, supra note 4, at 650: "In the context of an increasing
awareness of human rights generally and the recognition of the particular problems of disadvantaged
groups, indigenous peoples and their representatives have been in the vanguard of attempts to deal
with ethnic and other conflicts by invoking or creating international norms."
139. See, eg., supra note 61; Analytical Compilation, supra note 137 (providing statements, con-
cerns, and proposals by interested governments and indigenous peoples' organizations).




Evaluating the modest successes achieved to date by indigenous peo-
ples and their advocates in the international human rights process pro-
vides a unique opportunity to enrich our understanding of a number of
subjects of concern to critical race theory and scholarship. Throughout
their works, critical race scholars have underscored the need to develop a
more sophisticated understanding of the strategic functioning of rights
discourse in the social movements of peoples of color. 141 As Kimberl6
Williams Crenshaw stated: "Attempts to harness the power of the state
through the appropriate rhetorical/legal incantations should be appreci-
ated as intensely powerful and calculated political acts. In the context of
white supremacy, engaging in rights discourse should be seen as an act of
self-defense." 142
In the context of the contemporary indigenous struggle for survival
and international legal protection, rights discourse has functioned effec-
tively in generating a shared, empowering vocabulary and syntax for in-
digenous peoples. The discourse of international human rights has
enabled indigenous peoples to understand and express their oppression in
terms that are meaningful to them and their oppressors. Thinking in
terms of rights has organized indigenous peoples on a global scale to
combat their shared experiences of being excluded and oppressed by the
dominant world order.143 The use of rights rhetoric in international
human rights standard-setting bodies such as the Working Group illus-
trates the ways in which indigenous people can transform the dominant
perception of their rights in the international context. Again relying on
Professor Crenshaw's insights,
Powerless people can sometimes trigger.., a crisis by challenging an
institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. Such a
crisis occurs when powerless people force open and politicize a contra-
diction between the dominant ideology and their reality."' 144
The power of indigenous peoples' own stories in dramatically rede-
fining the reality of their struggle for survival in the world underscores
the capacity of narrative to transform legal thought and doctrine about
141. See, eg., Crenshaw, supra note 1; Delgado, Ethereal Scholar, supra note 1; P. Williams,
supra note 1; R. Williams, supra note 1.
142. Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1382.
143. As Professor Crenshaw has observed in reflecting on the organizing function of rights dis-
course in the experience of the black civil rights movement in this country:
Perhaps the action of the Civil Rights community was effective, for example, because it
raised the novel idea of Blacks exercising rights. Indeed, thinking in terms of rights may
have been a radical and liberating activity for Blacks.... The expression of rights.. was a
central organizing feature of the civil rights movement.
It. at 1364.
144. Ma at 1367 (footnote omitted).
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rights. This central insight about the power of stories is explored fre-
quently in the works of a number of critical race scholars.1 45
Reliance on narratives of government abuses and assaults on indige-
nous survival that can be easily translated in the legal language of inter-
national human rights norms has proved extremely effective for
indigenous peoples to raise consciousness at the international level about
the human rights that matter to them. In an article appearing in this
Symposium, 146 Professor Gerald Torres has sought to draw our attention
to the importance of permitting indigenous peoples and outsider groups
generally to tell their stories in terms that account for their own experi-
ence of the world rather than the experience of the dominant group. As
Professor Torres relates, the Mashpee Indians were disabled from telling
their story in a United States federal court by legal rules that worked to
silence their claims. Their stories, Torres compellingly laments, "were
stories that legal ears could not hear." 147
Thus, the Working Group Draft Declaration would seem to provide
some useful, empirically-grounded evidence to support the beliefs of criti-
cal race scholars about the power of stories to transform legal thought
and doctrine. But perhaps even more importantly, the Draft Declaration
also provides a rare glimpse of what happens in a formalized legal setting
when disempowered groups are not required to legitimate crucial aspects
of their alternative legal visions in terms dictated by standing and eviden-
tiary standards that are not designed with them in mind.
The Working Group Draft Declaration also affirms the important
roles fairness and formality must play if rights rhetoric and conscious-
ness-raising through narrative are to be effective tools for the social
movements of peoples of color. Several critical race theorists, most nota-
bly Professor Richard Delgado,1 4 have argued that bias and prejudice
among legal decisionmakers and disputants are most likely to be counter-
acted through fair reliance on formal procedures applied in open adjudi-
catory settings in which "public" values-values such as equality and
dignity-are allowed to come to the fore. 149
According to Professor Delgado, the risks of prejudice leading to
the denial of justice are greatest when a member of an oppressed group
145. See ag., D. BELL, supra note 1; Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists, supra note 1; Mat-
suda, supra note 1.
146. See Torres & Milun, supra note 66, at 625.
147. Id at 649.
148. See, eg., sources cited in supra note 25. See also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2325 (describing
why measures to eliminate effects of oppression "are best implemented through formal rules, formal
procedures and formal concepts of rights, for informality and oppression are frequent fellow-
travelers.").
149. See Delgado & Dunn, Minimizing Risk, supra note 25, at 1387-91.
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confronts an oppressor directly and when there are few rules to constrain
conduct; when the setting is closed and does not make clear that "public"
values are to govern the confrontation; and when the confrontation
touches a sensitive area of life, such as culture-based conduct.'50
Unfortunately, too many of these factors have combined to deny
justice in situations in which indigenous peoples and their advocates have
sought to tell their stories of the rights that matter to them before the
domestic political and legal systems of settler state governments. Even in
the United States'5 '-which is regarded as having one of the world's
most progressive records when it comes to modern-day protections for
indigenous rights' 52-American Indian tribes must lobby and litigate the
terms of their survival under a regime of law that treats their collective
rights as peoples as subject to complete defeasance by a conquering gov-
ernment. In the United States, the courts of the conqueror have vested
Congress with plenary power to define Indian rights, constrained only by
a weakly interpreted "trust" responsibility that Congress itself can define,
limit, or terminate at its own political whim or caprice. 5 3
In other settler states, the situation is far worse. Indigenous rights
in many countries are not even recognized in domestic law and policy.
Often times, states impose forced assimilation programs upon indigenous
peoples and regard any questioning of their indigenous policies by other
international actors as unjustified impertinence towards a sovereign state
under international law. In Latin America and Asia, for example, deci-
sions about the cultural survival of indigenous peoples are made in dis-
tant capitols and boardrooms of multinational corporations without ever
listening to the views or preferences of indigenous peoples about the
rights that matter to them.
The Working Group, however, has allowed indigenous peoples to
tell their stories and thereby humanize their struggles. States have had to
respond and explain their actions and policies that endanger the survival
of indigenous peoples through the mediary capacity of the Working
Group. The Working Group, it should be remembered, is a fact-finding
and standard-setting body composed of a racially and culturally diverse
group of individuals-all of whom serve in their individual capacities as
human rights experts. The highly charged and sensitive issues raised
150. Id
151. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
152. See, eg., C. WILINSON, AMERICAN INDIANs, TIME AND THE LAW 5 (1987) (noting that
"the policy of the United States towards its native people is one of the most progressive of any
nation").
153. See R. Williams, supra note 15, at 289-91 (describing United States federal Indian law
principles of congressional plenary power and trust).
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when settler state practices and laws threaten the cultural beliefs and
ways of life of indigenous peoples have had to be discussed in the context
of the "public" values animating and sustaining the international human
rights process. Actors in settings such as a United Nations human rights
standard-setting body are not likely to express the biased and prejudiced
views of indigenous culture that often are reflected in domestic policies,
law, and decisionmaking. The "equal status contact" between indige-
nous peoples and settler states before the Working Group strongly reaf-
firms the public values of common humanity, dignity, equality and
elimination of all forms of racial prejudice widely perceived as informing
the international human rights process.154
In conclusion, despite the denials by some legal academics of the
efficacy of rights discourse and storytelling in the social movements of
peoples of color,'55 indigenous peoples of color have demonstrably bene-
fited by their reliance on these liberating forms of discourse applied in the
formalized standard-setting activities of the international human rights
process. Standard-setting bodies like the Working Group provide previ-
ously unavailable, formally structured opportunities for open dialogue
and encounter that enable indigenous peoples to define the precarious
terms of their survival in the world under the European doctrine of dis-
covery. Drawing on their histories, traditions, experiences, and the sheer
weight of their testimony, indigenous peoples have convincingly demon-
strated to the Working Group that the present, dominant conceptions of
their rights and status in international law have failed to protect their
human rights to survival. The United Nations Working Group's Draft
Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, therefore, pro-
vides a powerful and empowering instance of the ways in which peoples
of color, such as indigenous peoples, through their own stories, can seek
to transform legal thought and doctrine about their human rights accord-
ing to the terms of a different vision of justice in the world.
154. See Delgado & Dunn, Minimizing Risk, supra note 25, at 1386 (describing benefits of
"equal status contact" for outsider groups).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
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